The collected works of William Hazlitt, Vol. 11 (of 12)Hazlitt, William
Philosophy
The collected works of William Hazlitt, Vol. 11 (of 12)
Hazlitt, William
English essays -- 19th century
The celebrated maxims of Rochefoucault contain a good deal of truth
mixed up with more falsehood. They might in general be easily reversed.
The whole artifice of the author consists in availing himself of the
_mixed_ nature of motives, so as to detect some indirect or sinister
bias even in the best, and he then proceeds to argue as if they were
_simple_, that is, had but one principle, and that principle the worst.
By the same extreme mode of reasoning which he adopts, that is, by
taking the exception for the rule, it might be shewn that there is no
such thing as selfishness, pride, vanity, revenge, envy, &c. in our
nature, with quite as much plausibility as he has attempted to shew that
there is no such thing as love, friendship, gratitude, generosity, or
true benevolence. If the slightest associated circumstance, or latent
impulse connected with our actions, is to be magnified into the whole
motive, merely by the microscopic acuteness which discovered it, why not
complete the paradox, by resolving our vices into some pretence to
virtue, which almost always accompanies and qualifies them? Or is it to
be taken for granted that our vices are sincere, and our virtues only
hypocrisy and affectation? Shakespeare has given a much simpler and
better account of the matter, when he says, ‘The web of our life is of a
mingled yarn: our virtues would be proud, if our faults whipped them
not; and our vices would despair, if they were not cherished by our
virtues.’ The most favourable representations of human nature are not
certainly the most popular. The character of _Sir Charles Grandison_ is
insipid compared with that of _Lovelace_, as _Satan_ is the hero of
_Paradise Lost_; and Mandeville’s _Fable of the Bees_ is read with more
interest and avidity than the _Practice of Piety_ or Grove’s _Ethics_.
Whatever deviates from the plain path of duty, or contradicts received
opinions, seems to imply a strength of will, or a strength of
understanding, which seizes forcibly on the attention. Whether it is
fortitude or cowardice, or both, there is a strong propensity in the
human mind, if its suspicions are once raised, _to know the worst_. It
is the same in speculation as in practice. When once the fairy dream in
which we have lulled our senses or imagination is disturbed, we only
feel ourselves secure from the delusions of self-love by distrusting
appearances altogether, and revenge ourselves for the cheat which we
think has been put upon us, by laughing at the credulity of those who
are still its dupes.[28] Even the very love of virtue makes the mind
proportionably impatient of every thing like doubt respecting it, and
prompts us to escape from tormenting suspense in total indifference, as
jealousy cures itself by destroying its object. The _Fable of the Bees_,
the _Maxims of Rochefoucault_, the _Treatise on the Falsity of Human
Virtues_, and the book _De l’Esprit_ have owed much of their popularity
to the consolation they afforded to disappointed hope.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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