The collected works of William Hazlitt, Vol. 12 (of 12)Hazlitt, William
General
The collected works of William Hazlitt, Vol. 12 (of 12)
Hazlitt, William
English essays -- 19th century
_B._ And yet this very miracle takes place every day in the human mind
and heart, and you and your sophists would persuade us that it is
nothing, and would slur over its existence by a shallow misnomer. Do I
not by imaginary sympathy acquire a new interest (out of myself) in
others as much as I should on the former supposition by physical contact
or animal magnetism? and am I not compelled by this new law of my nature
(neither included in physical sensation nor a deliberate regard to my
own individual welfare) to consult the feelings and wishes of the new
social body of which I am become a member, often to the prejudice of my
own? The parallel seems to me exact, and I think the inference from it
unavoidable. I do not postpone a benevolent or friendly purpose to my
own personal convenience, or make it bend to it—
‘Letting _I should not_ wait upon _I would_,
Like the poor cat in the adage.’
The will is amenable not to our immediate sensibility but to reason and
imagination, which point out and enforce a line of duty very different
from that prescribed by self-love. The operation of sympathy or social
feeling, though it has its seat certainly in the mind of the individual,
is neither for his immediate behalf nor to his remote benefit, but is
constantly a diversion from both, and therefore, I contend, is not in
any sense selfish. The movements in my breast as much originate in, and
are regulated by, the _idea_ of what another feels, as if they were
governed by a chord placed there vibrating to another’s pain. If these
movements were mechanical, they would be considered as directed to the
good of another: it is odd, that because my bosom takes part and beats
in unison with them, they should become of a less generous character. In
the passions of hatred, resentment, sullenness, or even in low spirits,
we voluntarily go through a great deal of pain, because _such is our
pleasure_; or strictly, because certain objects have taken hold of our
imagination, and we cannot, or will not, get rid of the impression: why
should good-nature and generosity be the only feelings in which we will
not allow a little forgetfulness of ourselves? Once more. If self-love,
or each individual’s sensibility, sympathy, what you will, were like an
animalcule, sensitive, quick, shrinking instantly from whatever gave it
pain, seeking instinctively whatever gave it pleasure, and having no
other obligation or law of its existence, then I should be most ready to
acknowledge that this principle was in its nature, end, and origin,
selfish, slippery, treacherous, inert, inoperative but as an instrument
of some immediate stimulus, incapable of generous sacrifice or painful
exertion, and deserving a name and title accordingly, leading one to
bestow upon it its proper attributes. But the very reverse of all this
happens. The mind is tenacious of remote purposes, indifferent to
immediate feelings, which cannot consist with the nature of a rational
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account