185/1 Cro. Jac. 262 (8 Jac. I.). Compare Maynard's argument in Williams v. Hide, Palmer, 548; Symons v. Darknoll, ib. 523, and other cases below; 1 Roll. Abr. 4, F, pl. 3. Mosley v, Fosset, Moore, 543 (40 Eliz.); an obscurely reported case, seems to have been assumpsit against an agistor, for a horse stolen while in his charge, and asserts obiter that "without such special assumpsit the action does not lie." This must have reference to the form of the action, as the judges who decided Southcote's Case took part in the decision. See, further, Evans v. Yeoman, Clayton, 33. 186/1 See Symons v. Darknoll, and the second count in Morse v. Slue infra. (The latter case shows the averment of negligence to have been mere form.) Cf. I Salk. 18, top. 187/1 Supra, p. 179. 187/2 Boson v. Sandford, Shower, 101; Coggs v. Bernard, infra. 187/3 Symons v. Darknoll, infra. 188/1 Reg. Brev. 92b, 95a, 98a, 100b, 104a; cf. Y.B. 19 Ed. II. 624; 30 Ed. III. 25, 26; 2 Hen. IV. 18, pl. 6; 22 Hen. VI. 21, pl. 38; 32 & 33 Ed. I., Int., xxxiii.; Brunner, Schwurgerichte, 177; id. Franzosische, Inhaberpapier, 9, n. 1. 188/2 12 Co. Rep. 64. 188/3 See, besides the following cases, the declaration in Chamberlain v. Cooke, 2 Ventris, 75 (1 W. & M.), and note especially the variations of statement in Morse v. Slue, set forth below, in the text. 189/1 Hobart, 17; Cro. Jac. 330. See also George v. Wiburn, 1 Roll. Abr. 6, pl. 4 (A.D. 1638). 190/1 The use which has been made of this case in later times shows the extreme difficulty in distinguishing between principles of substantive law and rules relating only to procedure, in the older books. 190/2 Y.B. 22 Hen. VI. 21, pl. 38; supra, p. 188, n. 1. 191/1 Palmer, 523. 191/2 Palmer, 548. 191/3 Aleyn, 93. 191/4 1 Sid. 36. 192/1 1 Sid. 244. Cf. Dalston v. Janson, 1 Ld. Raym. 58. 192/2 2 Keb. 866; 3 id. 72, 112, 135; 2 Lev. 69; I Vent. 190, 238; 1 Mod. 85; Sir T. Raym. 220. 193/1 2 Keb. 866. See 3 Keb. 74; 1 Mod. 85; Sir T. Raym. 220. 193/2 2 Keb. 72. 193/3 Y.B. 33 Hen. VI. 1; supra, p. 177. 193/4 3 Keble, 73. This is the main point mentioned by Sir T. Raymond and Levinz. 193/5 Cf. 1 Mod. 85. 194/1 1 Ventris, 238, citing Southcote's Case in the margin. Cf. 3 Keble, 135. 194/2 Aleyn, 93; supra, p. 191. 194/3 See also 1 Hale, P.C. 512, 513. 195/1 King v. Viscount Hertford, 2 Shower, 172, pl. 164; cf. Woodlife's Case, supra. 195/2 Boson v. Sandford, 1 Shower, 101 (2 W. & M.). See above, pp. 183,185; below, p. 197. Modern illustrations of the doctrine will be found in Fleming v. Manchester, Sheffield, & Lincolnshire Railway Co., 4 Q.B.D. 81, and cases cited. In Boorman v. Brown, 3 Q.B.511, 526, the reader the primitive assumpsit, which was the inducement to a declaration in tort, interpreted as meaning contract in the modern sense. It will be seen directly that Lord Holt took a different view. Note the mode of dealing with the Marshal's case, 33 Hen; VI. 1, in Aleyn, 27.