318/2 Bullen & Leake, Prec. of Plead. (3d ed.), 147, "Conditions Precedent." 319/1 Cf. Cort v. Ambergate, Nottingham & Boston & Eastern Junction Railway Co., 17 Q.B.127. 320/1 Goodman v. Pocock, 15 Q.B.576 (1850). 325/1 Fisher v. Mellen, 103 Mass. 503. 325/2 Supra, p. 136. 327/1 Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 33. 328/1 See the explanation of Dimech v. Corlett, 12 Moo. P.C. 199, in Behn v. Burness, 3 B. & S. 751, 760. 329/1 Behn v. Burness, 3 B. & S. 751. 329/2 Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 28, p. 1000. 329/3 See Lecture VIII. 330/1 Kennedy v. Panama, &c. Mail Co., L.R. 2 Q.B.580, 588; Lyon v. Bertram, 20 How. 149, 153. Cf. Windscheid, Pand., Section 76, nn. 6, 9. 330/2 Windscheid, Pand., Section 76(4). See, generally, Ibid., nn. 6, 7; Section 78, pp. 206, 207; Section 82, pp. 216 et seq. 331/1 Cr. Ihering, Geist d. Roem. Rechts, Section 48, III. p. 116 (Fr. transl.). 331/2 See, however, the language of Crompton, J. in S.C., I B. & S. 877. Cf. Kent, Comm. (12th ed.), 479, n. 1, A (c). 331/3 Behn v. Burness, 3 B. & S. 751, 755, 756. 334/1 Cf. Anglo-Egyptian Navigation Co. v. Rennie, L.R. 10 C.P. 271. 334/2 Ellen v. Topp, 6 Exch. 424. 335/1 Contracts (2d Ed.), Section 106, and passim. 336/1 Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 M. & W. 399, 404. Possibly Behn v. Burness, stated above, might have been dealt with in this way. The ship tendered was not a ship which had been in the port of Amsterdam at the date of the contract. It was therefore not such a ship as the contract called for. 336/2 Heyworth v. Hutchinson, L.R. 2 Q.B.447, criticised in Benj. Sales (2d ed.), pp. 742 et seq. 336/3 See Thomas v. Cadwallader, Willes, 496; Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Sections 116, 140. This is put as a case of equivalence by Mr. Langdell (Contr., Section 116); but the above explanation is believed to be the true one. It will be noticed that this is hardly a true case of condition, but merely a limitation of the scope of the tenant's promise. So a covenant to serve as apprentice in a trade, which the other party covenants to teach, can only be performed if the other will teach, and must therefore be limited to that event. Cf. Ellen v. Topp, 6 Exch. 424. 337/1 Langdell, Contracts (2d ed.), Section 127. Cf. Roberts v. Brett, 11 H. L. C. 337. 339/1 Graves v. Legg, 9 Exch. 709. Cf. Lang. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 33, p. 1004. Mr. Langdell says that a bought note, though part of a bilateral contract, is to be treated as unilateral, and that it may be presumed that the language of the contract relied on was that of a bought note, and thus a condition in favor of the defendant, who made it. I do not quite understand how this can be assumed when the declaration states a bilateral contract, and the question arose on demurrer to a plea, which also states that the plaintiff "was by the agreement bound to declare" the names. How remote the explanation is from the actual ground of decision will be seen.