Of the Scots we are told that: Of fectand men I trow thai ware Thretty thousand, and sum deill mare * * * * * Weill thretty thousand men and ma Mak we four battalis of all thai. * * * * * The quethir thai war thretty thousand. On the English side we have a statement in the ‘Vita Edwardi Secundi.’ It is there asserted, of the host marching on Stirling, that Erant autem armatorum amplius quam duo milia, excepta peditum turba copiosa.[585] The same authority states that Bruce Circiter quadraginta milia hominum secum produxit.... Ibant etiam quasi sepes densa conserti, nec leviter potuit talis turba penetrari.[586] Let us now see how modern writers have dealt with the numbers present, remembering that the character and issue of the battle turn largely on the vast numbers assigned to the English host. In the ‘Dictionary of National Biography’ (1886) Dr. Æneas Mackay adopts the traditional view of the English numbers, following Barbour, indeed, blindly: On 11 June the whole available forces of England, with a contingent from Ireland, numbering in all about 100,000 men, of whom 50,000 were archers, and 40,000 cavalry, were mustered at Berwick.[587] A far abler and more cautious writer, Mr. Joseph Bain, F.S.A. Scot., in his ‘Calendar of Documents relating to Scotland’ (1887), reckoned that “the whole English army probably did not exceed 50,000.”[588] Against Hailes on the Scottish side, he supports Hume, who, he writes: founded on the writs enrolled in the _Foedera_, addressed to the sheriffs of twelve English counties, two earls, and five barons for the foot, who numbered in all 21,540. This is undoubtedly good authority, for ... the Patent Rolls of the time are not defective. Contingents from all the English shires were not invariably summoned. In the writs in question the men of the northern and midland counties, which incurred most danger from the Scots, were summoned (p. xx.). From Mr. Bain I turn to our latest authority, Mr. Oman’s ‘History of the Art of War.’ To the memorable Scottish victory Mr. Oman, as we might expect, devotes special attention (pp. 570–579). He attributes “the most lamentable defeat which an English army ever suffered” to two fatal errors, of which one “was the crowding such a vast army on to a front of no more than two thousand yards” (p. 579). His argument, in detail, is this: Two thousand yards of frontage only affords comfortable space for 1,500 horsemen or 3,000 foot-soldiers abreast. This was well enough for the main line of the Scottish host, formed in three battles of perhaps 25,000 men in all, _i.e._ eight or nine deep in continuous line. But, allowing for the greater space required for the cavalry, the English were far too many for such a front, with the ten thousand horse and 50,000 or 60,000 foot which they may have mustered.