In Gibbons _v._ Ogden[769] cognizance was taken of the existence in the States of an "immense mass" of legislative power to be used for the protection of their welfare and the promotion of local interests.[770] In Marshall's opinion in Brown _v._ Maryland[771] this power is christened "the Police Power," a name which has since come to supply one of the great titles of Constitutional Law. Counsel for Maryland had argued that if the State was not permitted to _tax_ imports in the original package before they left the hands of the importer, it would also be unable to prevent their introduction into its midst although they might comprise articles dangerous to the public health and safety. "The power to direct the removal of gunpowder," the Chief Justice answered, "is a branch of the police power, which unquestionably remains, and ought to remain, with the States;" and the power to direct "the removal or destruction of infectious or unsound articles" fell within the same category.[772] STATE CURBS ON ENTRY OF FOREIGNERS In short, the power to tax was one thing, the police power something quite different. To concede the former would be to concede a power which could be exercised to any extent and at the will of its possessor;[773] to concede the latter was to concede a power which was limited of its own inherent nature to certain necessary objectives. In New York _v._ Miln,[774] however, the Court which came after Marshall inclined toward the notion of a power of internal police which was also unlimited; and on this ground upheld a New York statute which required masters of all vessels arriving at the port of New York to make reports as to passengers carried, and imposed fines for failure to do so. "We are of opinion," the Court said, "that the act is not a regulation of commerce, but of police." But, when New York, venturing a step further, passed an act to authorize State health commissioners to collect certain fees from captains arriving in ports of that State, and when Massachusetts enacted a statute requiring captains of ships to give bonds as to immigrants landed, both measures were pronounced void, either as conflicting with treaties and laws of the United States or as invading the "exclusive" power of Congress to regulate foreign commerce.[775] Following the Civil War, indeed, New York _v._ Miln was flatly overruled, and a New York statute similar to the one sustained in 1837 was pronounced void as intruding upon Congress's powers.[776] Nothing was gained, said the Court, by invoking "[the police power] * * *, it is clear, from the nature of our complex form of government, that, whenever the statute of a State invades the domain of legislation which belongs exclusively to the Congress of the United States, it is void, no matter under what class of powers it may fall, or how closely allied to powers conceded to belong to the States."[777] At the same time a California statute