Certain recent cases have had to deal with State regulation of the milk business. In Nebbia _v._ New York,[967] decided in 1934, that State's law regulating the price of milk was sustained by the Court against objections based on the due process clause of Amendment XIV. A year later, in Baldwin _v._ Seelig[968] the refusal of a license under the same act to a dealer who had procured his milk at a lower minimum price than producers were guaranteed in New York, was set aside as an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce. However, a Pennsylvania statute requiring dealers to obtain licenses was sustained as to one who procured milk from neighboring farms and shipped it all into a neighboring State for sale.[969] The purpose of the act, explained Justice Roberts, was to control "a domestic situation in the interest of the welfare of the producers and consumers," and its application to the kind of case before the Court was essential to its effective enforcement and affected interstate commerce only incidentally.[970] But when a distributor of milk in Massachusetts, who already had two milk stations in Eastern New York, was refused a license for a third on the ground, among others, that the further diversion of milk to Massachusetts would deprive the local market of a supply needed during the short season, a narrowly divided Court interposed its veto on the basis of Oklahoma _v._ Kansas Natural Gas Co.[971] STATE CONSERVATION AND EMBARGO MEASURES: THE SHRIMP CASES Meantime, Geer _v._ Connecticut has been somewhat overcast by subsequent rulings. In a case, decided in 1928, it was held that a Louisiana statute which permitted the shipment of shrimp taken in the tidal waters of Louisiana marshes only if the heads and hulls have been previously removed was unconstitutional.[972] Distinguishing Geer _v._ Connecticut the Court said: "As the representative of its people, the State might have retained the shrimp for [local] consumption and use therein." But the object of the Louisiana statute was in direct opposition to the conservation of a local food supply. Its object was to favor the canning of shrimp for the interstate market. "* * * by permitting its shrimp to be taken and all the products thereof to be shipped and sold in interstate commerce, the State necessarily releases its hold and, as to the shrimp so taken, definitely terminates its control. * * * And those taking the shrimp under the authority of the act necessarily thereby become entitled to the rights of private ownership and the protection of the commerce clause."[973] On the same reasoning a South Carolina statute which required that owners of shrimp boats, fishing in the marine waters off the coast of the State, dock at a State port and unload, pack and stamp their catch with a tax stamp before shipping or transporting it to another State, was pronounced void in 1948.[974] However, a California statute which restricted the processing of fish,