The position of enemy property was dealt with by Chief Justice Marshall in the early case of Brown _v._ United States.[1298] Here it was held that the mere declaration of war by Congress does not effect a confiscation of enemy property situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, but the right of Congress by further enactment to subject such property to confiscation was asserted in the most positive terms. Being an exercise of the war powers of the Government, such confiscation is not affected by the restrictions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Since it has no relation to the personal guilt of the owner, it is immaterial whether the property belongs to an alien, a neutral, or even to a citizen of the United States. The whole doctrine of confiscation is built upon the foundation that it is an instrument of coercion, which, by depriving an enemy of property within the reach of his power, whether within his territory or without it, impairs his ability to resist the confiscating government, while at the same time it furnishes to that government means for carrying on the war. Any property which the enemy can use, either by actual appropriation, or by the exercise of control over the owner, no matter what his nationality, is a proper subject of confiscation. Congress may provide for immediate seizure of property which the President or his agent determines to be enemy property, leaving the question of enemy ownership to be settled later at the suit of a claimant. For these reasons the Confiscation Act of 1862,[1299] and the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 and amendments thereto, were held to be within the power of Congress to "make rules concerning captures on land and water."[1300] PRIZES OF WAR