The Continental Monthly, Vol. 4, No. 5, November, 1863Various
History
The Continental Monthly, Vol. 4, No. 5, November, 1863
Various
Literature, Modern -- 19th century -- Periodicals; United States -- Politics and government -- 19th century -- Periodicals
Upon this point there seems to be a radical difference of understanding
between our contributor and ourselves. Be it pantheism, or whatever any
one else may choose to call it, we entertain the very simple belief that
the ultimate laws of nature, impressed upon the material world, are
nothing less than the direct power of the Almighty upholding the
universe, and controlling all its operations throughout all time from
the origin of the creation to its end, if it shall have one. We cannot
look upon the system of nature as a piece of machinery, wound up and set
a-going, and destined to run its appointed course, with only an
occasional glance of its Author to interfere with its regular working.
We do not suppose that this constant exercise of power imposes any
burden upon the Author of the creation; nor are we conscious of any
diminution of his glory, or any denial of his absolute personality, when
we consider him as being ever present in all his works, 'animating,
informing, and shaping them,' by the perpetual exertion of his
omnipotent will.
We do not, by any means, understand our contributor as denying the
agency of the Almighty in the establishment of general laws; but his
view of the subject is totally different from ours. If we have not
misconceived his meaning entirely, he considers the laws of nature as
something independent of the operations which they control--a _tertium
quid_ interposed between the creator and his work. God is the author;
law is the active agent; and material changes are the results. Law is
not spirit; and therefore matter is not moved and controlled by spirit.
We entirely disclaim any want of respect for our contributor and his
thoughts; but we must express our surprise that he should resort to this
clumsy and unphilosophical theory, in order to deny the direct agency of
spirit in the operations of nature. Law is not separate and distinct
from the phenomena which it regulates. It is only a rule or principle,
as he himself admits, 'which ceases to be with the accomplishment of its
end.' This rule or principle, which implies intelligence and will, must
be in the mind of the Author, who operates in accordance with it, and
not in the mere matter whose changes it controls. Yet our author
strangely says, 'all the objects of nature are the products, not of
spirit, but of law, which is itself the product of the one great
Creative Spirit whereby all things are.'
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