And finally, the constitutional right in certain cases to suspend the ordinary privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_ carries with it, of course, an equally constitutional right to make what you call 'arbitrary arrests.' The very object of granting the power to vacate the privilege of the writ is to enable the Executive to hold in custody such persons as it may judge the 'public safety requires' the holding of--without its purpose being frustrated by judicial interference. But the power to _hold_ in custody is utterly nugatory, if there be no power to _take_ into custody. To suppose that the Constitution grants the one, but denies the other, is to suppose it self-stultified by contradictory provisions--and that in a case where the public safety in time of imminent peril is concerned. The only consistent and sensible view of the Constitution is, that as the validity of the writ of _habeas corpus_ is the ordinary rule, and its suspension the extraordinary exception--so the power to make arrests by civil process only is the ordinary rule, and the power to make arrests by military or executive authority is the extraordinary exception--both exceptions alike holding 'when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require.' In such cases the ordinary guarantees of personal liberty are constitutionally made to give way to the operation of the extraordinary powers demanded by the necessities of the state. It has always been so in all Governments; and every Government--unless it suicidally abnegate its highest function and supremest duty, that of maintaining itself and securing the national safety--must, in time of rebellion and civil war, possess such powers, powers to repress and prevent, in the first moment of necessity, what, if let go on, it might be too late to cure by judicial or any other process.