My first objection, then, to the organization against Mr. Lincoln is, that it is a mere party organization, arrayed under an old party name, and marching under an old party banner. In the midst of a great contest like this, when all old party names and prejudices should be forgotten, and when Democrats and Republicans should be united as brethren in the one grand effort to suppress the rebellion, the Chicago McClellan Convention reopens old party strifes, renews old party issues, and, denouncing Republicans, assumes the name and professes to represent the Democratic party. It was the banner of the Union that was raised by the Convention at Baltimore, and the salvation of the Union, with its rescue from present and future perils, the suppression of the rebellion, with the removal of the cause, constituted the only issues presented by that Convention to the people of the loyal States of all parties. It was far otherwise at Chicago. It was a mere assemblage of partisans, some for, and some against the Union, in the search of power and emoluments. It was the flag of the Union that was given to the breeze at Baltimore. It was the flag of a party that was unfolded at Chicago. '_For the Union_' was written on the flag of the one--'For the Democratic party' was inscribed on the standard of the other. It was said that the Baltimore Convention has made the abolition of Slavery one of its issues; but, as well might it be objected that it had made the prosecution of the war, or the maintenance of the army or navy, part of its creed. The Emancipation Proclamation of the President had its whole constitutional force as a _war measure_ TO SAVE THE UNION, and, as such, it was adopted by Mr. Lincoln as ex-officio 'commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States.' That it was, as a war measure, perfectly constitutional, I have never doubted, and so declared in an article published at the time in THE CONTINENTAL MAGAZINE. It is the duty of all persons, not aliens, to unite with the President in suppressing a rebellion. Slaves, in the relation which they occupy to the National Government under the Federal Constitution, are '_persons_.' As _persons_, they are thrice named in the Constitution, and by no other name whatever. Especially, under the clause providing for direct taxation, they are _enumerated_ as _persons_, not _valued_ as _property_. The term 'person' is used more frequently in the Constitution than any other, and it is applied expressly to slaves, and to the whole people of the United States, including the President and Vice President, who are designated therein as persons. This very question, whether slaves are persons or property under the Constitution, arose in the great case of _Groves_ vs. _Slaughter_, when, in 1841 (with a single dissenting opinion, that of Judge Baldwin), after the fullest argument on both sides, it was unanimously decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that slaves, in the relation which they hold to the