The Cornhill Magazine (Vol. I, No. 5, May 1860)Various
General
The Cornhill Magazine (Vol. I, No. 5, May 1860)
Various
England -- Periodicals; English literature -- Periodicals; Short stories, English -- Periodicals
No one will say that I have not done justice to this argument. I have
stated it as clearly and forcibly as possible, not with any design to
captivate your assent, but to make the answer complete. This argument
is the _cheval de bataille_ of the Cuvier school; but like many other
argumentative war-horses, it proves, on close inspection, to be spavined
and brokenwinded. The first criticism we must pass on it is, that it
implies the existence of Species as a _thing_, which can be spoken of
as fixed or variable; whereas, as we saw last month, Species is an
_abstraction_, like Whiteness or Strength. No one supposes that there
exists any whiteness apart from white things, or strength apart from
strong things; yet the naturalists who maintain the fixity of Species,
constantly talk as if Species existed independently of the individual
animals. Instead of saying that by the word Species is indicated a
certain group of characters, and that whenever we meet with this group
we say, here is an animal of the same Species; they explicitly declare,
or tacitly imply, that although an individual dog may vary, there is
something above all individuals—the Species—and _that_ cannot vary. As
it is possible some readers may protest that no respectable authority
in modern times ever held the opinion here imputed to a school, I will
quote the very explicit language of one of Cuvier’s disciples—the last
editor of Buffon—who, no later than 1856, could declare that “Species
are the primitive forms of Nature. Individuals are nothing but the
representatives—the copies of these forms: _Les espèces sont les formes
primitives de la Nature. Les individus n’en sont que des représentations,
des copies._”[12] According to this very explicit, but very extravagant,
statement, an individual dog is nothing but a copy of the primitive
form—the typical dog—the _idea_ of a dog, as Plato would say; and of
course, if this be true, it matters little how widely individual dogs may
vary, the type, or species, of which it is the representative, remains
unaltered. Indeed it is on this ground that many physiologists explain
the fact of hereditary transmission: the individual may vary, it is
said, but the species is preserved; and if a dog, without its fore paws,
has offspring, every one of which possesses the fore paws, the reason
is, that _l’idée de l’espèce se reproduit dans le fruit, et lui donne
des organes qui manquaient au père ou à la mère_.[13] It is not easy to
understand how the _idea_ of species can reproduce itself, and give the
offspring of a dog the _organs_ which were wanting in the parents; but to
those who believe that Species exist independently of individuals, and
form the only real existences, the conception may be easier.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account