Corsair (Yacht); World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations
Escort and convoy ships are ordered not to bring anything overboard.
Burn all you can and if impossible to burn, bring overboard rubbish
altogether at once in the beginning of night. All the rubbish spread
over the sea are precious indice for the submarine to know the curse
of the convoy.
During the rest of the winter and through the spring of 1918, the
_Corsair_ was with the convoys and continued to base in the Gironde.
The work seemed humdrum and monotonous to the crews, who pined for
excitement and encounters, but this very fact was proof that the
Navy was achieving the result expected of it, which was to keep the
road open to France. Submarines ran amuck now and then and strafed a
coastwise convoy of slow ships or sank an empty transport homeward
bound, but never for a moment was the prodigious movement of troops and
material interfered with or delayed. Grouping the steamers together and
screening them with escort vessels, as far as possible, had baffled the
high hopes of Von Tirpitz and his murderous gang.
The captains of these ships which moved deep-laden through the war
zone were learning the tricks of the trade and intelligently adapting
themselves to the exactions of the convoy system. Admiral Sims said of
them:
The advantages of the convoy were so apparent to me that, despite the
pessimistic attitude of the merchant captains, there were a number
of officers in the British navy who kept insisting that it should be
tried. In the discussion I took my stand emphatically on the side of
this school. From the beginning I had believed in this method for
combating the U-boat warfare. Certain early experiences had led me to
believe that the merchant captains were wrong in underestimating the
quality of their own seamanship. These intelligent and hardy men did
not know what splendid ship handlers they were. In my discussions with
them they had disclosed an exaggerated idea of the seamanly ability of
naval officers in manœuvring their large fleets. They attributed this
to the superior training of the men and the special qualities of the
ships. “Naval vessels are built so they can keep station and turn at
any angle at a moment’s notice,” they would say, “but we have no
men in our ships who can do such things.” They particularly rejected
the idea that when in formation they could manœuvre their ships in fog
or at night without lights. They believed they would lose more ships
through collision than the submarines could sink.
[Illustration: AMERICAN YACHTS CLUSTERED INSIDE THE BREAKWATER, BREST]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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