When Stephen VI. succeeded to the tiara in 896, one of his first acts was to cause the body of his predecessor, Formosus, to be exhumed and brought to trial on the charge of having unlawfully and sacrilegiously usurped the papal dignity. A writ of summons was issued in due form and the corpse of the octogenarian pope, which had lain already eight months in the grave, was dug up, re-arrayed in full pontificals and seated on a throne in the council-hall of St. Peter’s, where a synod had been convened to adjudicate upon the case. No legal formality was omitted in this strange procedure and a deacon was appointed to defend the accused, although the synodical jury was known to be packed and the verdict predetermined. Formosus was found guilty and condemned to deposition. No sooner was the sentence pronounced than the executioners thrust him from the throne, stripped him of his pontifical robes and other ensigns of office, cut off the three benedictory fingers of his right hand, dragged him by the feet out of the judgment-hall and threw his body “as a pestilential thing” (_uti quoddam mephiticum_) into the Tiber. Not until several months later, after Stephen himself had been strangled in prison, were the mutilated and putrefied remains of Formosus taken out of the water and restored to the tomb. The Athenian Prytaneum, as we have already seen, was guilty of the childishness of prosecuting inanimate objects, but it never violated the sepulchre for the purpose of inflicting post-humous punishment on corpses. The perpetration of this brutality was reserved for the Papal See. From the standpoint of ancient and mediæval jurisprudents the overt act alone was assumed to constitute the crime; the mental condition of the criminal was never or at least very seldom taken into consideration. It is remarkable how long this crude and superficial conception of justice prevailed, and how very recently even the first attempts have been made to establish penal codes on a philosophic basis. The punishableness of an offence is now generally recognized as depending solely upon the sanity and rationality of the offender. Crime, morally and legally considered, presupposes, not perfect, for such a thing does not exist, but normal freedom of the will on the part of the agent. Where this element is wanting, there is no culpability, whatever may have been the consequences of the act. Modern criminal law looks primarily to the psychical origin of the deed, and only secondarily to its physical effects; mediæval criminal law ignored the origin altogether, and regarded exclusively the effects, which it dealt with on the homœopenal principle of _similia similibus puniantur_, for the most part blindly and brutally applied.