The Crisis of Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-One in the Government of the United States.: Its Cause, and How It Should Be MetStreight, Abel D.
History
The Crisis of Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-One in the Government of the United States.: Its Cause, and How It Should Be Met
Streight, Abel D.
Secession; United States -- Politics and government -- 1857-1861
"It is as popular, just as truly emenating from the people, as the
State governments. It is created for one purpose; the State
governments for another. It has its own powers; they have theirs.
There is no more authority with them to arrest the operation of a law
of congress, than with congress to arrest the operation of their laws.
We are here to administer a constitution emenating immediately from
the people, and trusted by them to our administration. It is not the
creature of the State governments. It is of no moment to the argument
that certain acts of the State legislatures are necessary to fill our
seats in this body. That is not one of their original State powers, a
part of the sovereignty of the State. It is a duty which the people,
by the constitution itself, have imposed on the State legislatures,
and which they might have left to be performed elsewhere, if they had
seen fit. So they have left the choice of president with electors; but
all this does not affect the proposition that this whole
government--president, senate and house of representatives--is a
popular government. It leaves it still all its popular character. The
governor of a State (in some of the States) is chosen not directly by
the people for the purpose of performing, among other duties, that of
electing a governor. Is the government of the State on that account
not a popular government? This government, sir, is the independent
offspring of the popular will. It is not the creature of State
legislatures; nay, more, if the whole truth must be told, the people
brought it into existence, established it, and have hitherto supported
it, for the very purpose, amongst others, of imposing certain salutary
restraints on State sovereignties. The States cannot now make war;
they cannot contract alliances; they cannot make, each for itself,
separate regulations of commerce; they cannot lay imposts; they cannot
coin money. If this constitution, sir, be the creature of State
legislatures, it must be admitted that it has obtained a strange
control over the volition of its creators."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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