The Crisis of the Naval WarJellicoe, John Rushworth
History
The Crisis of the Naval War
Jellicoe, John Rushworth
World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations -- Submarine; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations, British
The need for sloops was so great that I sent a personal telegram to Mr.
Schwab, whose acquaintance I had made in October, 1914, on the occasion
of the loss of the _Audacious_, begging him to build at once a hundred
of these vessels to our order. I felt certain from the experience we had
gained of Mr. Schwab's wonderful energy and power, as illustrated by the
work accomplished by him in providing us in 1915 with ten submarines
built in the extraordinarily short period of five months, that he would
produce sloops at a very rapid rate and that there would be no delay in
starting if he undertook the work. The drawings had already been sent
over. However he was not able to undertake the work as the U.S.
Government decided that his yards would all be required for their own
work. This was unfortunate, as I had hoped that these vessels would have
been built in from four to six months, seeing that the drawings were
actually ready; they would have been invaluable in the latter part of
1917.
Whilst the mission was in the United States constant communications
passed on these subjects, the heavy losses taking place in merchant
ships were stated, and every effort was made to impress upon the Navy
Department the urgency of the situation.
The tenor of our communications will be gathered from these quotations
from a personal telegram sent by me to Admiral de Chair on April 26,
viz.:
"For Rear-Admiral de Chair from First Sea Lord.
"You must emphasize most strongly to the United States authorities the
very serious nature of the shipping position. We lost 55 British ships
last week approximately 180,000 tons and rate of loss is not
diminishing.
* * * * *
"Press most strongly that the number of destroyers sent to Ireland
should be increased to twenty-four at once if this number is available.
"Battleships are not required but concentration on the vital question of
defeat of submarine menace is essential.
"Urge on the authorities that everything should give way to the
submarine menace and that by far the most important place on which to
concentrate patrols is the S.W. of Ireland.
* * * * *
"You must keep constantly before the U.S. authorities the great gravity
of the situation and the need that exists for immediate action.
"Our new methods will not be effective until July and the critical
period is April to July."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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