In January, 1918, the total dropped to 58,568 tons, and in February was only 100,038 tons. In March it was announced that Lord Pirie would take the position of Controller General of Merchant Shipbuilding. The subsequent results in the direction of output of merchant ships do not properly come within the scope of this book, which is intended to deal only with work during the year 1917, but it may be of interest to give here the output month by month. It was as follows: January 58,568 July 141,948 February 100,038 August 124,675 March 161,674 September 144,772 April 111,533 October 136,000 May 197,274 November 105,093 June 134,159 December 118,276 Total for the year 1,534,110 It will be seen that the results for 1918 were an improvement on those for 1917, the exact figure for that year being 1,163,474 tons; these results, however, fell very short of the optimistic estimates given in July, 1917. MERCANTILE REPAIR WORK The Controller's Department undoubtedly succeeded in the work of improving the arrangements for the repair of merchant ships. This is shown by an analysis of the total number of vessels that _completed_ repairs during various months. In August, 1917, the number was 382, with a tonnage of 1,183,000. In November the figure became 542 ships, with a tonnage of 1,509,000. There remained under repair at the end of August 326 ships, and at the end of November 350 ships, these figures indicating that the greater number of completions was not due to the smaller number of vessels being damaged or the damages being less in extent. Considerable credit is due to the Department for this successful acceleration of repair work which naturally had a great influence on the shipping situation. ARMAMENT PRODUCTION It was not, I think, realized either by the Government or by the civilians brought into the Admiralty during the year 1917 that there was a very great difference between the Admiralty and the War Office organizations in the matter of production of material, nor was it recognized that naval officers are by their training and experience better fitted to deal with such matters on a large scale than are military officers, except perhaps officers in the Artillery and Royal Engineers. Whatever may be the case in the future, the Navy in pre-war days was so much more dependent on material than the Army as to make questions relating to naval material of far greater importance that was the case with military material. This fact is apt to be forgotten by those writers on naval affairs who think that an intimate knowledge of questions relating to naval material _and its use_ is of little importance. I trust that this belief will never become general in the service, for the naval officer who is not familiar with the design and production of material is handicapped when he comes to use it.