The Crisis of the Naval WarJellicoe, John Rushworth
History
The Crisis of the Naval War
Jellicoe, John Rushworth
World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations -- Submarine; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations, British
The danger which confronted the British peoples was never so great in
any previous period as it was during the year 1917 when the submarine
menace was at its height, and it may be hoped that the lessons to be
learned from the history of those months will never be forgotten. The
British Empire differs from any other nation or empire which has ever
existed. Our sea communications are our very life-blood, and it is not
greatly exaggerating the case to say that the safety of those
communications is the one consideration of first-class importance. Upon
a solid sense of their security depends not only our prosperity, but
also the actual lives of a large proportion of the inhabitants. There is
no other nation in the world which is situated as the people of these
islands are situated; therefore there is no other nation to whom sea
power is in the least degree as essential as it is to us. Four out of
five of our loaves and most of our raw materials for manufacture must
come to us by sea, and it is only by the sea that we can hold any
commercial intercourse with the Dominions, Dependencies and Crown
Colonies, which together make up what we call the Empire, with a
population of 400,000,000 people.
What, then, are we to do in the future to ensure the safety of the
communications between these islands and the rest of the Empire? As a
matter of course we should be in a position to safeguard them against
any possible form of attack from whatever quarter it may come. So far as
can be seen there is no present likelihood of the transport of food or
raw materials being effected in anything but vessels which move upon the
surface of the sea. It is true that, as a result of the war, people's
thoughts turn in the direction of transport, both of human beings and of
merchandise, by air or under the water, but there is no possible chance,
for at least a generation to come, of either of these methods of
transport being able to compete commercially with transport in vessels
sailing on the sea. Therefore the problem of guarding our communications
resolves itself into one of securing the safety of vessels which move
upon the surface of the sea, whatever may be the character of the
attack.
I do not desire to enter into any discussion here as to the method by
which these vessels can be protected, except to say that it is necessary
for us to be in a position of superiority in all the weapons by which
their safety may be endangered. At the present time there are two
principal forms of attack: (1) by vessels which move on the surface, and
(2) by vessels which move under water. A third danger--namely, one from
the air--is also becoming of increasing importance. The war has shown us
how to ensure safety against the first two forms of attack, and our duty
as members of a great maritime Empire is to take steps to maintain
effective forces for the purpose.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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