This disaster to the Scandinavian convoy was bound to bring into prominence the question of affording to it protection against future attacks by surface vessels, for necessarily the protection against surface vessels differed from that against submarines, a point which was sometimes overlooked by those who were unfamiliar with the demands of the two wars which were being waged--the one on the surface and the other under the surface. It was very difficult to furnish efficient protection against the surface form of attack from the resources of the Grand Fleet if the practice of running a daily convoy was continued, because it was impossible to forecast the strength or exact character--battle-cruisers, cruisers or destroyers--of the attack; and the first step was to reduce the number of convoys and to increase correspondingly the number of ships in each convoy. A telegram was sent to the Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands on October 26 asking whether the convoys could be conveniently reduced to three per week. A reply was received on the 29th to the effect that the convoy could be run every third day under certain conditions; the important conditions were the use of the Tyne instead of the Hurnber as a collecting port, and the provision of eight extra trawlers and nine modern destroyers. Sir Frederick Brock stated that he was assuming cruiser protection to the convoys and that the details would need to be worked out before the change could be made. He suggested a conference. He was requested on October 31 to consult the Vice-Admiral Commanding East Coast of England as to the practicability of using the Tyne as a convoy collecting port. Meanwhile Sir F. Brock had prepared a scheme for giving effect to his proposals, and on November 5 he sent copies of this scheme to the Vice-Admiral Commanding East Coast of England and other officers concerned for their consideration.