On December 12 a second attack on the convoy took place. In this instance the attack was carried out by four German destroyers. Two convoys were at sea, one east-bound and one west-bound, the east-bound convoy being attacked. It was screened against submarine attack by two destroyers--the _Pellew_ and _Partridge_--and four armed trawlers, and comprised six vessels, one being British and the remainder neutrals. The attack took place in approximately Lat. 59.50 N., Long. 3.50 E., and the action resulted in the _Partridge_, the four trawlers, and the whole of the convoy being sunk, and the _Pellew_ was so severely damaged as to be incapable of continuing the action. At the time of this attack a west-bound convoy was at sea to the westward of the other convoy, and two armoured cruisers--the _Shannon_ and _Minotaur_--with four destroyers were acting as a covering force for the convoys against attack by surface vessels. A wireless signal from the _Partridge_ having been intercepted, this force steamed at full speed for the scene of the action, the destroyers arriving in time to pick up 100 survivors from the convoy and trawlers, but not in time to save the convoy. The 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, also at sea, was some 85 miles to the southward and eastward of the convoy when attacked, but neither this force nor the _Shannon's_ force succeeded in intercepting the enemy before he reached port. The short hours of daylight greatly facilitated his escape. On receipt of the report of the meeting of December 10, and in view of the attack of December 12, the question of the interval between convoys was specially considered in its relation to the ability of the Grand Fleet to furnish protection against surface attack. It was decided that for this reason it would only be possible to sail convoys from Methil every third day so as to avoid having two convoys at sea at a time, a situation with which the Grand Fleet could not deal satisfactorily. The organization then drawn up actually came into effect on January 20, 1918, after my departure from the Admiralty, and was continued with certain modifications to the end of the war. The principal modification was an increase of the interval between convoys, first, to four, and later to five days in order to relieve the strain on the Grand Fleet arising from the provision of covering forces; the disadvantage of the resultant increased size of the convoys had to be accepted. Under the new system the Commander-in-Chief Coast of Scotland at Rosyth--Admiral Sir Cecil Burney--became responsible for the control of the Scandinavian convoys, the Admiralty selecting the routes.