Causation; Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy, German; Reason
We see that the ens rationis is distinguished from the nihil negativum
or pure nothing by the consideration that the former must not be
reckoned among possibilities, because it is a mere fiction—though not
self-contradictory, while the latter is completely opposed to all
possibility, inasmuch as the conception annihilates itself. Both,
however, are empty conceptions. On the other hand, the nihil privativum
and ens imaginarium are empty data for conceptions. If light be not
given to the senses, we cannot represent to ourselves darkness, and if
extended objects are not perceived, we cannot represent space. Neither
the negation, nor the mere form of intuition can, without something
real, be an object.
SECOND DIVISION—TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
INTRODUCTION.
I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance
We termed dialectic in general a logic of appearance. This does not
signify a doctrine of probability; for probability is truth, only
cognized upon insufficient grounds, and though the information it
gives us is imperfect, it is not therefore deceitful. Hence it must
not be separated from the analytical part of logic. Still less must
phenomenon and appearance be held to be identical. For truth or
illusory appearance does not reside in the object, in so far as it
is intuited, but in the judgement upon the object, in so far as it
is thought. It is, therefore, quite correct to say that the senses
do not err, not because they always judge correctly, but because
they do not judge at all. Hence truth and error, consequently also,
illusory appearance as the cause of error, are only to be found in a
judgement, that is, in the relation of an object to our understanding.
In a cognition which completely harmonizes with the laws of the
understanding, no error can exist. In a representation of the senses—as
not containing any judgement—there is also no error. But no power of
nature can of itself deviate from its own laws. Hence neither the
understanding per se (without the influence of another cause), nor the
senses per se, would fall into error; the former could not, because,
if it acts only according to its own laws, the effect (the judgement)
must necessarily accord with these laws. But in accordance with the
laws of the understanding consists the formal element in all truth. In
the senses there is no judgement—neither a true nor a false one. But,
as we have no source of cognition besides these two, it follows that
error is caused solely by the unobserved influence of the sensibility
upon the understanding. And thus it happens that the subjective grounds
of a judgement blend and are confounded with the objective, and cause
them to deviate from their proper determination,[40] just as a body
in motion would always of itself proceed in a straight line, but if
another impetus gives to it a different direction, it will then start
off into a curvilinear line of motion. To distinguish the peculiar
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