Causation; Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy, German; Reason
But if the existence of a transcendental faculty of freedom is
granted—a faculty of originating changes in the world—this faculty must
at least exist out of and apart from the world; although it is
certainly a bold assumption, that, over and above the complete content
of all possible intuitions, there still exists an object which cannot
be presented in any possible perception. But, to attribute to
substances in the world itself such a faculty, is quite inadmissible;
for, in this case; the connection of phenomena reciprocally determining
and determined according to general laws, which is termed nature, and
along with it the criteria of empirical truth, which enable us to
distinguish experience from mere visionary dreaming, would almost
entirely disappear. In proximity with such a lawless faculty of
freedom, a system of nature is hardly cogitable; for the laws of the
latter would be continually subject to the intrusive influences of the
former, and the course of phenomena, which would otherwise proceed
regularly and uniformly, would become thereby confused and
disconnected.
FOURTH CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. THESIS.
There exists either in, or in connection with the world—either as a
part of it, or as the cause of it—an absolutely necessary being.
PROOF.
The world of sense, as the sum total of all phenomena, contains a
series of changes. For, without such a series, the mental
representation of the series of time itself, as the condition of the
possibility of the sensuous world, could not be presented to us.[55]
But every change stands under its condition, which precedes it in time
and renders it necessary. Now the existence of a given condition
presupposes a complete series of conditions up to the absolutely
unconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary. It follows that
something that is absolutely necessary must exist, if change exists as
its consequence. But this necessary thing itself belongs to the
sensuous world. For suppose it to exist out of and apart from it, the
series of cosmical changes would receive from it a beginning, and yet
this necessary cause would not itself belong to the world of sense. But
this is impossible. For, as the beginning of a series in time is
determined only by that which precedes it in time, the supreme
condition of the beginning of a series of changes must exist in the
time in which this series itself did not exist; for a beginning
supposes a time preceding, in which the thing that begins to be was not
in existence. The causality of the necessary cause of changes, and
consequently the cause itself, must for these reasons belong to
time—and to phenomena, time being possible only as the form of
phenomena. Consequently, it cannot be cogitated as separated from the
world of sense—the sum total of all phenomena. There is, therefore,
contained in the world, something that is absolutely necessary—whether
it be the whole cosmical series itself, or only a part of it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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