The probability of any considerable area of new corn land being exploited, either at home or abroad, is very small. A recent circular letter by a man prominent in the cash corn trade, states that there is not an uncultivated acre of available corn land in the United States. This is a radical statement, and does not allow for the fact that with a sufficient price stimulus, considerable wheat, or even cotton land, would be diverted to corn. But whatever allowances are made for an increased corn production, it must be admitted that the possibilities are largely confined to the United States. Wheat acreage is not thus circumscribed; in fact, the case is practically reversed; almost 80% of the natural increase in wheat production will come from outside our boundaries. Of the principal wheat producing countries,--France, Germany, Russia, Poland and Caucasus, Italy, Hungary, Spain, Roumania and Argentine Republic--the two first named alone fail to keep pace with the United States in ratio of increased production, and others have made up the deficit of these two laggards. In a nutshell, the difference between the relative positions of wheat and corn is this: The world’s supply of wheat will be furnished by the world, while the world’s supply of corn must be furnished by the United States. It appears, therefore, that while wheat and corn may both be expected to gradually seek a higher average price in sympathy with the general upward trend, corn is affected by a specific influence, the effects of which must be added to the homogeneous advance. It is not possible that the supply of corn should increase as rapidly as the demand, under the circumscribed conditions herein set forth. As has already been suggested, the price of corn may become attractive enough to cause the diversion of wheat and cotton lands to corn growing. The possibilities of such a course, however, are not only limited by nature, but such action would stop itself at a certain point by decreasing the supply of wheat or cotton, and again restoring them to favor with the planter. The speculator may, therefore, reasonably believe that corn is destined, eventually, to reach much higher prices. He must, of course, allow for the temporary influences of large and small crops, and the numerous other actual and technical conditions which cause intermediate fluctuations, and must furthermore bear steadily in mind the fact that there is a limit beyond which the price of corn can never be sustained. When a given commodity goes beyond a price where it can be replaced by another commodity, it has gone too far; and when necessities become luxuries, they take their places as such, and demand slackens. [Illustration: FLUCTUATIONS OF COTTON PRICES FOR TEN YEARS. (The rims of the circles touch the average high and low price of cotton each year for 10 years.) Reproduced, by permission, from MOODY’S MAGAZINE of June, 1906.] _Cycles of Cotton Speculation._[6]