The simplest and earliest of these in which men's powers, similar
in kind and degree, are united in pursuit of a benefit which, when
obtained, they all participate in, is most familiarly exemplified in
the catching of game by primitive men: this simplest and earliest
form of industrial co-operation being also that which is least
differentiated from militant co-operation; for the co-operators are
the same, and the processes, both destructive of life, are carried on
in analogous ways. The condition under which such co-operation may be
successfully carried on is that the co-operators shall share alike
in the produce. Each thus being enabled to repay himself in food for
the expended effort, and being further enabled to achieve other such
desired ends as maintenance of family, obtains satisfaction: there is
no aggression of one on another, and the co-operation is harmonious.
Of course the divided produce can be but roughly proportioned to the
several efforts joined in obtaining it, but there is actually among
savages, as we see that for harmonious co-operation there must be, a
recognition of the principle that efforts when combined shall severally
bring equivalent benefits, as they would do if they were separate.
Moreover, beyond the taking equal shares in return for labors that are
approximately equal, there is generally an attempt at proportioning
benefit to achievement, by assigning something extra, in the shape of
the best part or the trophy, to the actual slayer of the game. And
obviously, if there is a wide departure from this system of sharing
benefits when there has been a sharing of efforts, the co-operation
will cease. Individual hunters will prefer to do the best they can for
themselves separately.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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