In its ultimate form, then, altruism will be the achievement of
gratification through sympathy with those gratifications of others
which are mainly produced by their activities of all kinds successfully
carried on--sympathetic gratification which costs the receiver nothing,
but is a gratis addition to his egoistic gratifications. This power of
representing in idea the mental states of others, which, during the
process of adaptation has had the function of mitigating suffering,
must, as the suffering falls to a minimum, come to have almost wholly
the function of mutually exalting men's enjoyments by giving every one
a vivid intuition of his neighbor's enjoyments. While pain prevails
widely, it is undesirable that each should participate much in the
consciousnesses of others; but with an increasing predominance of
pleasure, participation in others' consciousnesses becomes a gain of
pleasure to all.
And so there will disappear that apparently permanent opposition
between egoism and altruism, implied by the compromise reached in the
last chapter. Subjectively looked at, the conciliation will be such
that the individual will not have to balance between self-regarding
impulses and other-regarding impulses; but, instead, those
satisfactions of other-regarding impulses which involve self-sacrifice,
becoming rare and much prized, will be so unhesitatingly preferred
that the competition of self-regarding impulses with them will
scarcely be felt. And the subjective conciliation will also be such
that though altruistic pleasure will be attained, yet the motive of
action will not consciously be the attainment of altruistic pleasure;
but the idea present will be the securing of others' pleasures.
Meanwhile, the conciliation objectively considered will be equally
complete. Though each, no longer needing to maintain his egoistic
claims, will tend rather when occasion offers to surrender them, yet
others, similarly natured, will not permit him in any large measure
to do this, and that fulfillment of personal desires required for
completion of his life will thus be secured to him; though not now
egoistic in the ordinary sense, yet the effects of due egoism will be
achieved. Nor is this all. As, at an early stage, egoistic competition,
first reaching a compromise such that each claims no more than his
equitable share, afterward rises to a conciliation such that each
insists on the taking of equitable shares by others; so, at the latest
stage, altruistic competition, first reaching a compromise under
which each restrains himself from taking an undue share of altruistic
satisfactions, eventually rises to a conciliation under which each
takes care that others shall have their opportunities for altruistic
satisfactions: the highest altruism being that which ministers not to
the egoistic satisfactions of others only, but also to their altruistic
satisfactions.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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