About the time of the concentration of the Georgia and Carolina forces for combined operations against St. Augustine, that town was materially reinforced by the arrival of six Spanish half-galleys,—manned by two hundred regular troops and armed with long brass nine-pounder guns,—and two sloops loaded with provisions. Warned by the preliminary demonstration which eventuated, as we have seen, in the capture of forts Francis de Papa and Diego, the enemy massed all detachments within the lines of St. Augustine, collected cattle from the adjacent region, and prepared for a vigorous defense. Apprehending that he might not be able to carry the town by assault from the land side,—where its entrenchments were strong and well armed,—unless supported by a demonstration in force from the men of war approaching the town where it looks toward the sea and where it was not covered by earth-works, and being without the requisite pioneer corps and artillery train for the conduct of a regular siege, before putting his army in motion General Oglethorpe instructed the naval commanders to rendezvous off the bar of the north channel, and blockade that and the Matanzas pass to St. Augustine. Captain Warren, with two hundred sailors, was to land on Anastasia island and erect batteries for bombarding the town in front. When his land forces should come into position and be prepared for the assault, he was to notify Sir Yelverton Peyton, commanding the naval forces, and St. Augustine would thus be attacked on all sides. Shortly after the middle of May, 1740, General Oglethorpe, with a land army numbering over two thousand regulars, militia, and Indians, moved upon St. Augustine. Fort Moosa,[88] situated within two miles of that place, lay in his route. Upon his approach the garrison evacuated it and retired within the lines of the town. Having burnt the gates of this fort and caused three breaches in its walls, General Oglethorpe, on the 5th of June, made his reconnoissances of the land defenses of St. Augustine and prepared for the contemplated assault. Everything being in readiness, the signal previously agreed upon to insure the coöperation of the naval forces was given; but, to the General’s surprise and mortification, no response was returned. His forces being disposed and eager for the attack, the signal was repeated, but failed to evoke the anticipated answer. Satisfied that the town could not be carried without the assistance of the naval forces, and being ignorant of the cause of their non-action, the General reluctantly withdrew his army and placed it in camp at a convenient distance, there to remain until he could ascertain the reason of the failure on the part of the navy to coöperate in the plan which had been preconcerted. This failure was explained in this wise. Inside the bar, and at such a remove that they could not be affected by the fire of the British vessels of war,—the Flamborough, the Phœnix, the Squirrel, the