For this reason, the Euclidean soul of the Classical Culture could only experience its existence, bound as this was to present foregrounds, in the form of _incidents of the Classical style_. If in respect of the Western soul we can regard incident as a minor order of Destiny, in respect of the Classical soul it is just the reverse. Destiny is incident become immense—that is the very signification of Ananke, Heimarmene, Fatum. As the Classical soul did not genuinely live through history, it possessed no genuine feeling for a _logic_ of Destiny. We must not be misled by words. The most popular goddess of Hellenism was Tyche, whom the Greeks were practically unable to distinguish from Ananke. But Incident and Destiny are felt by _us_ with all the intensity of an opposition, and on the issue of this opposition we feel that everything fundamental in our existence depends. _Our_ history is that of great connexions, Classical history—its full actuality, that is, and not merely the image of it that we get in the historian (e.g., Herodotus)—is that of anecdotes, of a series of plastic details. The style of the Classical life generally, the style of every individual life within it, is anecdotal, using the word with all seriousness. The sense-perceivable side of events condenses on _anti-historical, daemonic, absurd_ incidents; it is the denial and disavowal of all logic of happening. The stories of the Classical master-tragedies one and all _exhaust_ themselves in incidents that mock at any meaning of the world; they are the exact denotation of what is connoted by the word εἱμαρμένη[163] in contrast to the Shakesperian _logic_ of incident. Consider Œdipus once more: that which happened to him was wholly extrinsic, was neither brought about nor conditioned by anything subjective to himself, and could just as well have happened to anyone else. This is the very _form of the Classical myth_. Compare with it the necessity—inherent in and governed by the man’s whole existence and the relation of that existence to Time—that resides in the destiny of Othello, of Don Quixote, of Werther. It is, as we have said before, the difference of situation-tragedy and character-tragedy. And this opposition repeats itself in history proper—every epoch of the West has character, while each epoch of the Classical only presents a situation. While the life of Goethe was one of fate-filled logic, that of Cæsar was one of mythical indidentalness, and it was left to Shakespeare to _introduce_ logic into it. Napoleon is a tragic character, Alcibiades fell into tragic situations. Astrology, in the form in which from Gothic to Baroque the Western soul knew it—was dominated by it even in denying it—was the attempt to master one’s _whole_ future life-course; the Faustian horoscope, of which the best-known example is perhaps that drawn out for Wallenstein by Kepler, _presupposes_ a steady and purposeful direction in the existence that has yet to be accomplished.