Again the question is: By whom and for whom is Western law made? The Roman prætor was a landowner, a military officer, a man experienced in administrative and financial questions; and it was just this experience that was held to qualify him for the inseparable functions of expounder and maker of the law. The peregrin prætor developed his aliens’ law as a law of commercial intercourse adapted to the Late Classical megalopolis--without plan, without tendency, out of the cases that came before him and nothing else. But the Faustian will-to-duration demands a book, something valid “for evermore,”[123] a system that is intended to provide in advance for every possible case, and this book, a work of learning, necessarily called for a scholarly class of jurists and judges--the doctors of the faculties, the old German legal families, and the French “_noblesse de robe_.” The English judges, who number hardly over a hundred,[124] are drawn indeed from an upper class of advocates (the “barristers”), but they actually rank above many members of the Government. A scholar-class is alien to the world, and despises experience that does not originate in thought. Inevitably conflict arises between the “state of knowledge” as the scholar will accept it and the flowing custom of practical life. That manuscript of the Pandect of Irnerius became, and for centuries remained, the “world” in which learned jurists lived. Even in England, where there are no law faculties (in the European sense), it was exclusively the legal profession that controlled further growth, so that even here the development of legal ideas diverged from the development of general life. Thus what we have hitherto called juristic science is in fact either the philology of law-language, or the scholarship of law-ideas. It is now the only science that still continues to deduce the meaning of life from “eternally valid” principles. “The German jurisprudence of to-day,” says Sohm,[125] “represents very largely indeed an inheritance from mediæval Scholasticism. We have not yet begun to consider in deep earnest the bearing of the basic values of the _actual_ life about us upon legal theory. We do not even yet know what these values are.” Here, then, is the task that German thought of the future has to perform. From the practical life of the present it has to develop the deepest principles of that life and elevate them into basic law-ideas. If our great arts lie behind us, our great jurisprudence is yet to come. For the work of the nineteenth century--however creative that century believed itself to be--was merely preparatory. _It freed us from the book of Justinian, but not from the concepts._ The ideologues of Roman law among scholars no longer count, but scholarship of the old cast remains. It is another kind of jurisprudence that is needed now to free us from the schematism of these concepts. Philological expertness must give place to social and economic.