The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Translated into English with analyses and introductionsPlato
PhilosophyPhilosophy
The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Translated into English with analyses and introductions
Plato
Dialogues, Greek -- Translations into English; Philosophy, Ancient
And in some cases the name of the idea is not only
attached to the idea in an eternal connection, but anything
else which, not being the idea, exists only in the form of the
idea, may also lay claim to it. I will try to make this
clearer by an example:—The odd number is always called
by the name of odd?
Very true.
But is this the only thing which is called odd? Are there
not other things which have their own name, and yet are 104
called odd, because, although not the same as oddness, they
are never without oddness?—that is what I mean to ask—whether
numbers such as the number three are not of the
class of odd. And there are many other examples: would
you not say, for example, that three may be called by its
proper name, and also be called odd, which is not the same
with three? and this may be said not only of three but also
of five, and of every alternate number—each of them without
being oddness is odd; and in the same way two and four,
and the other series of alternate numbers, has every number
even, without being evenness. Do you agree?
[Sidenote: _Essential opposites and things which admit opposites._]
Of course.
[Sidenote: Not only essential opposites, but some concrete things which
contain opposites, exclude each other.]
Then now mark the point at which I am aiming:—not
only do essential opposites exclude one another, but also
concrete things, which, although not in themselves opposed,
contain opposites; these, I say, likewise reject the idea
which is opposed to that which is contained in them, and
when it approaches them they either perish or withdraw.
For example; Will not the number three endure annihilation
or anything sooner than be converted into an even number,
while remaining three?
Very true, said Cebes.
And yet, he said, the number two is certainly not opposed
to the number three?
It is not.
Then not only do opposite ideas repel the advance of one
another, but also there are other natures which repel the
approach of opposites.
Very true, he said.
Suppose, he said, that we endeavour, if possible, to determine
what these are.
By all means.
[Sidenote: That is to say the opposites which give an impress to other
things.]
Are they not, Cebes, such as compel the things of which
they have possession, not only to take their own form, but
also the form of some opposite?
What do you mean?
I mean, as I was just now saying, and as I am sure that
you know, that those things which are possessed by the
number three must not only be three in number, but must
also be odd.
Quite true.
And on this oddness, of which the number three has the
impress, the opposite idea will never intrude?
No.
And this impress was given by the odd principle?
Yes.
And to the odd is opposed the even?
True.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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