I am neither unmindful of, nor ungrateful for, the support we have received from your quarter. The inevitable necessity, which compelled an application for more, gave me great uneasiness. I was sensible the sum desired was very considerable. But so are our wants. It is our misfortune, not our fault, that we are obliged thus to trouble and distress our friends. I trust they will consider it in that light. There is nothing more precarious and immeasureable than what influences public credit. The sum sought would have enabled Congress to call in such a quantity of the paper emitted, as must establish the credit and value of the rest in defiance of all the efforts of our enemies. And I think that if our friends could lend us even as much as would constitute a fund here, on which Congress might draw, so as to call in at once one or two million dollars, it would greatly raise the value of the rest. This would require about eight or ten million livres. When it is seen that the redemption is begun, hopes and expectations will be raised, and credit grow upon them. But emitting more, without redeeming any, makes people think that no redemption is intended, and consequently produces doubts and discredit. It is long ago that I foresaw, and I had the honor of stating it at Burgos, the necessity of providing for the support of our funds, or rather funds themselves, by the assistance of our friends in Europe. I will venture to say, that one million sterling, furnished in this manner, would have been a more effectual aid than all the preparations that have or can be made, unless they go to actual hostilities. Have these preparations prevented twelve ships of the line from being sent on our coasts to augment enormously that naval force, which was already sufficient to stop our commerce and prevent us from sending our produce to procure funds in Europe? When we argue against facts we deceive ourselves. The fact then is, that these preparations, however formidable, have had so little effect, that though our enemies were hardly a match for France alone at sea, they ventured, in the face of those preparations, to despatch a powerful fleet against us. Some how or other they did not believe those preparations were meant against them. Have they been deceived in the event? Has their temerity been chastised as it deserved? Has the fleet of Spain joined that of France to crush at one blow their divided naval power? I do not mean to question the goodness of the reasons for this; I mean only to state the fact. I mean to show too that it is not extraordinary, that we should desire other aid than that which, however well intended, does not effectually operate to the relief intended. It is our necessity, not our choice, that speaks. To make a diversion in our favor was benevolent, to send us clothing for troops and naval stores was generous and friendly, but if that diversion has not hindered our commerce from being obstructed