Since writing the enclosed, I received a letter from the king of Prussia’s minister, informing me that his Majesty cannot at present open his ports to American armed vessels and the sale of their prizes, as he finds it is not permitted in France. I have apprized the minister of the late appointment by Congress to his Court, and do not think it improbable but that the king will in a little time be prevailed upon to wink at the above measure being executed, though he will not openly approve of it till an arrangement is made for acknowledging your independency. This will probably come under serious consideration before the winter ends, if General Howe should not be successful. The last letter I received from the Prussian Minister contains the following paragraph. _November 6._ “As to the reinforcement of troops, which Great Britain will receive from the other powers of Europe for the approaching campaign, I can assure you, Sir, that your nation has nothing to fear either from Russia or Denmark, and that even Germany will furnish only a few hundred men, whom the Duke of Brunswick, the Landgrave of Hesse, and the Margrave of Anspach, in conformity with their treaties, are obliged to send annually to recruit the troops, whom these princes maintain in America in the pay of England. It is with sincere satisfaction that I give you this consoling intelligence.” Our friends in Spain had been prevailed upon to renew the order for sending you supplies, but before anything was done, a suspension of it was occasioned by an American privateer making prize of a French ship coming from England with Spanish property on board. Proper measures have been taken to explain this proceeding, so as to appease the complaints it excited; and I have reason to hope, that we shall soon see the former good will towards us restored, with further proofs of its sincerity. I have mentioned the little probability our enemies have of obtaining troops for another campaign. Nor will their difficulties be less in raising supplies. Their credit falls so fast in Europe, that unless the most brilliant and effectual success of this campaign should retrieve it by rendering the conquest of America probable, they cannot sustain another. _Stat magni nominis umbra_ may almost now be said of Great Britain; and the decisive weight, a weight derived from her connexion with America in the balance of Europe which she has long held, will assuredly fail with the failure of this year’s expectations.