The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 03
History
The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 03
United States -- Foreign relations -- 1775-1783; United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783 -- Sources
We have not in a long time heard either from you or Mr Jay, so that we
are much in the dark respecting the probable prospect of a negotiation
this winter, or rather are led to conclude from your silence, that the
prospect is extremely remote; in which case, all your objects will
concentre in preparing for the ensuing campaign, and directing the
operations as far as possible to this country. The success of the
combined operations this summer will give great weight to your
arguments, especially as they are such as would deserve, independent
of that, the most serious attention. But, Sir, you will have a
difficult card to play, to induce France to do what not only our but
her interests essentially require. Never was there a time in which
money was more necessary to us than at present. The total abolition of
paper, the length of the war, the restricted commerce we have carried
on for the first five years of it, the arrears of debts, and the
slender thread by which public credit hangs, put it totally out of our
power to make any great exertions without the immediate supply of
money. Taxation will be carried as far as it can go, but this will
fall very far short of our wants. The richest nations in Europe,
unable to carry on a war by taxation only, are compelled to borrow.
How then will it be expected that a nation, which has had every
difficulty to struggle with, an enemy in the heart of its country, and
all its considerable towns at one time or another in their possession,
a superior navy on its coasts, and the consequential ruin of its
agriculture and commerce, how, I say, can it be expected that such a
nation should find resources within itself for so long and bloody a
war? And yet in this situation, we are alarmed by our advices from
you, by representations from the Minister of France, by assurances
from every quarter, that we must expect no further assistance in
money. Surely it is not possible that France, after having done so
much for us, after having brought us within view of the desired haven,
should oblige us to lose the advantage of all she has done; and yet be
assured that the most serious consequence may attend her stopping her
hand at this critical time. Public credit, which is growing very fast,
will drop to the ground. The contracts made for the ensuing campaign
must be given up; the troops, who were made to expect pay in specie,
will be dissatisfied; and upon the least ill fortune, a failure in
supplies will show their discontents; recruiting will be checked, and
the conclusion of the war on those advantageous terms, which one
vigorous exertion next spring in this country would secure, will be
postponed to a later period, when in fact all we wish, to enable us to
accomplish these great objects, is less than one year's continuance of
the war will cost France. You will, therefore, show the necessity of
setting our credit upon a firm basis, the prospect we have of
accomplishing it, from the great confidence in the integrity and
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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