The British Ministers are free to make any propositions to America, which they may think proper, provided they be not dishonorable in themselves, which in the present case is barred by the supposition of consent being obtained. In this case, therefore, if they should be inclined to offer a separate treaty, it is recommended to them to offer such terms to America, as should induce her to be desirous of closing with the proposal of a separate treaty, on the grounds of national security and interests, and likewise such as may constitute to them a case of reason and justice, upon which they may make requisition to their allies for their consent. It is suggested, that the offer to America of a truce of sufficient length, together with the removal of the British troops, would be equivalent to that case, which is provided for in the treaty of February 6th, 1778, between America and France, viz. _tacit_ independence; and the declared ends of that alliance being accomplished, it would not be reasonable that America should be dragged on by their allies in a war, the continuance of which, between France and Great Britain, could only be caused by separate European jealousies and resentments (if unfortunately for the public peace any such should arise) between themselves, independent and unconnected with the American cause. It is to be presumed, that France would not in point of honor to her allies refuse her consent so requested, as any rivalship or punctilios between her and Great Britain, as European nations, (principles which too frequently disturb the peace of mankind) could not be considered as _casus foederis_ of the American alliance; and their pride as a belligerent power would not permit them to claim the assistance of America as necessary to their support, thereby proclaiming their nation unequal to the contest in case of the continuance of a war with Great Britain, after the settlement and pacification with America. Their consent, therefore, is to be presumed. But if they should demur on this point, if Great Britain should be disposed to concede _tacit_ independence to America by a long truce, and the removal of the troops, and if the obstruction should evidently occur on the part of France, under any equivocal or captious construction of a _defensive_ treaty of alliance between America and France, Great Britain would from thenceforward stand upon advantage ground, either in any negotiation with America, or in the continuance of a war including America, but not arising from any further resentments of Great Britain towards America, but imposed reluctantly upon both parties by the conduct of the Court of France.