"Every impartial patriot has a long time perceived, that in the direction of affairs relative to this war with England, there has been manifested an inconceivable lukewarmness and sloth; but they discover themselves still more at this moment, by the little inclination which in general the Regencies of the Belgic Provinces testify to commence a treaty of commerce and friendship with the new Republic of the Thirteen United States of North America; and to contract engagements, at least during the continuance of this common war with the Crowns of France and Spain. Nevertheless, the necessity of these measures appears clearly, since according to our judgments, nothing was more natural, nor more conformable to sound policy, founded upon the laws of nature the most precise, than that this Republic immediately after the formal declaration of war by the English, (not being yet able to do anything by military exploits, not being in a state of defence sufficiently respectable to dare at sea to oppose one fleet or squadron to our perfidious enemy,) should have commenced by acknowledging, by a public declaration, the independence of North America. "This would have been from that time the greatest step to the humiliation of England, and our own re-establishment, and by this measure, the Republic would have proved her firm resolution to act with vigor. Every one of our inhabitants, all Europe, who have their eyes fixed upon us, the whole world expected, with just reason, this measure from the Republic. It is true, that before the formal declaration of war by England, one might perhaps have alleged some plausible reasons to justify in some degree the backwardness in this great and interesting affair. But, as at present Great Britain is no longer our secret, but our declared enemy, which dissolves all the connexions between the two nations; and as it is the duty not only of all the Regencies, but also of all the citizens of this Republic to reduce by all imaginable annoyances this enemy, so unjust to reason, and to force him if possible, to conclude an honorable peace; why should we hesitate any longer to strike, by this measure so reasonable, the most sensible blow to the common enemy? Will not this delay occasion a suspicion, that we prefer the interest of our enemy, to that of our country? North America, so sensibly offended by the refusal of her offer; France and Spain, in the midst of a war supported with activity, must they not regard us as the secret friends and favorers of their and our common enemy? Have they not reason to conclude from it, that our inaction ought to be less attributed to our weakness, than to our affection for England? Will not this opinion destroy all confidence in our nation heretofore so renowned in this respect? And our allies, at this time natural, must they not imagine, that it is better to have in us declared enemies, than pretended friends; and shall we not be involved in a ruinous war, which we might