The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 07
History
The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 07
United States -- Foreign relations -- 1775-1783; United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783 -- Sources
I should think it therefore advisable for Congress to instruct their
negotiators, to endeavor to obtain equity in this respect. This is the
time for it, if ever. If we cannot obtain it by negotiation, we must
think and talk of doing ourselves justice by making similar
distinctions in our own ports between our vessels and theirs. But here
again comes in the difficulty of uniting our States in such measures;
a difficulty which must be surmounted, or our commerce, navigation,
and marine will still be ruined, notwithstanding the conservation of
the fisheries. It deserves to be considered by whom this new method of
huddling up treaties at Paris is contrived, and for what purposes. It
may well be conjectured, that it is done with the secret intention of
preventing these things from being attended to; for there are persons
who had rather that any other people should have navigation than the
Americans. I have good reason to believe that it was known at
Versailles, that Mr Dana had well digested his thoughts upon this
subject, which was reason enough for some people to endeavor to take
Sweden out of his hands, in whose department it was. Their success is
much to be lamented.[10]
I had yesterday and the day before long conversations with the Baron
Van der Capellen de Pal, and M. Gyselaer. They both complain to me, in
the most pathetic terms, of the cruel situation of the friends of
America and France in this Republic. They both say, that they are
looking round every way like drowning men for support. The Province of
Friesland, their great dependence, wavers, and many of their
fellow-laborers are discouraged. They both inquired of me very
earnestly, if closer connexions could not be formed with us; if we
could not agree to warrant to each other the liberty of navigation, or
enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive. They see they shall
be obliged to make a shameful peace, and that the blame of it will
fall upon them, which will give a triumph to the Court, and put their
persons even in danger. They say, the King of France, by his
Ambassador, in July, 1782, gave them a positive assurance that he
would never separate his cause from theirs. In consequence of this,
they had instructed their Ambassadors never to separate their cause
from his. On their part the agreement had been sacredly observed, but
not on the other. With Great Britain enraged against them, with a
formidable party in the Republic furious against them, with the King
of Prussia threatening them, and abandoned by France, their prospects
are, they say, as disagreeable as can be conceived.
There are many appearances of designs to excite the people to
seditions, and I think it probable that the Court of London studies
delays of the Definitive Treaty in this hope. I still believe,
however, that the people will be wise and the Republic firm, and
submit to the immense losses of the war, and that of Negapatnam,
rather than renew their old submission to the Court and to England.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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