The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 07
History
The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 07
United States -- Foreign relations -- 1775-1783; United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783 -- Sources
1st. The separate article never appeared to me of any consequence to
conceal from this Court. It was an agreement we had a right to make;
it contained no injury to France or Spain. Indeed, I know not what
France has, or ever had, to do with it. If it had been communicated to
this Court, it would probably have been communicated to Spain, and she
might have thought more about it than it was worth. But how you could
conceive it possible for us to treat at all with the English, upon
supposition, that we had communicated every, the minutest thing, to
this Court, when this Court were neither obliged, nor thought proper,
to communicate anything whatever to us, I know not. We were bound by
treaty no more than they to communicate. The instructions were found
to be absolutely impracticable. That they were too suddenly
published, is very true.
2dly. A communication of the treaty to this Court, after it was agreed
upon, and before it was signed, would have infallibly prevented the
whole peace. In the first place, it was very doubtful, or rather, on
the contrary, it is certain, the English Minister never would have
consented that we should have communicated it. We might, it is true,
have done it without his consent or knowledge; but what would have
been the consequence? The French Minister would have said, the terms
were very good for us, but we must not sign till they signed; and this
would have been the continuance of the war for another year, at least.
It was not so much from an apprehension, that the French would have
exerted themselves to get away from us terms that were agreed on, that
they were withheld. It was then too late, and we have reasons to
apprehend, that all of this kind had been done, which could be done.
We knew they were often insinuating to the British Ministers things
against us, respecting the fisheries, tories, &c. during the
negotiation, and Mr Fitzherbert told me, that the Count de Vergennes
had "fifty times reproached him for ceding the fisheries, and said it
was ruining the English and French commerce both." It was not
suspicion, it was certain knowledge, that they were against us on the
points of the tories, fisheries, Mississippi, and the western country.
All this knowledge, however, did not influence us to conceal the
treaty. We did not, in fact, conceal it. Dr Franklin communicated the
substance of it to the Count and M. de Rayneval. So did I. In a long
conversation with the Count and M. de Rayneval together, I told them
the substance of what was agreed upon, and what we further insisted
on, and the English then disputed. But the signing before them is the
point. This we could not have done, if we had shown the treaty, and
told them we were ready. The Count would certainly have said to us,
you must not sign till we sign. To have signed after this would have
been more disagreeable to him, and to us too. Yet we must have signed
or lost the peace. The peace depended on a day.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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