"By looking over the chart we shall find, that Spain would lose almost the whole course of the Ohio, and that the establishments, which the Americans may have on this river, would remain untouched, and that even a very extensive space remains to form new ones. "As to the course and navigation of the Mississippi, they follow with the property, and they will belong, therefore, to the nation to which the two banks belong. If then, by the future treaty of peace, Spain preserves West Florida, she alone will be the proprietor of the course of the Mississippi from the thirtyfirst degree of latitude to the mouth of this river. Whatever may be the case with that part, which is beyond this point to the north, the United States of America can have no pretensions to it, not being masters of either border of this river. "As to what respects the lands situated to the northward of the Ohio, there is reason to presume that Spain can form no pretensions thereto. Their fate must be regulated with the Court of London." I did not return M. Rayneval any answer to his letter, nor any remarks on his memoir, but the first time I saw him afterwards I told him, I had received his letter and memoir he had done me the honor to write, and that I should send a copy of it to our Secretary for Foreign Affairs. As both the letter and memoir were _ostensibly_ written by him in a private character, it did not appear to me expedient or necessary to enter into any formal discussions with him on those subjects. The perusal of this memoir convinced me, 1st. That this Court would, at a peace, oppose our extension to the Mississippi. 2dly. That they would oppose our claim to the free navigation of that river. 3dly. That they would _probably_ support the _British_ claims to all the country above the 31st degree of latitude, and _certainly_ to all the country north of the Ohio. 4thly. That in case we should not agree to divide with Spain in the manner proposed, that then this Court would aid Spain in negotiating with Britain for the territory she wanted, and would agree that the residue should remain to Britain. In my opinion, it was not to be believed that the first and confidential Secretary of the Count de Vergennes would, without his knowledge and consent, declare such sentiments, and offer such propositions, and that, too, in writing. I therefore considered M. Rayneval as speaking the sentiments of the Minister, and I confess they alarmed me, especially as they seemed naturally to make a part of that system of policy, which I believed induced him rather to postpone the acknowledgment of our independence by Britain to the conclusion of a general peace, than aid us in procuring it at present. You will now be pleased to recollect the postscript to M. Rayneval's letter.