Great Britain, in my opinion, wishes not to make a separate peace with America, that she may be able to exert her whole force against the House of Bourbon, as many of her popular leaders have frequently expressed themselves. This would be humbling herself in a point on which she is most obstinately fixed. Much sooner would she humble herself before her ancient enemies, provided she could flatter herself, that by doing this, she might make a separate peace with them, and be thereby at liberty to direct her whole force against the United States. In this case she would cherish the hope, that America seeing herself forsaken by her new allies, and exposed singly to the whole power of Britain, might either be induced once more to submit to her domination, or would become an easy conquest, in part at least. So little wisdom, it is probable, experience has taught them. But is there the least hope for Britain, that her ancient enemies are prepared to give up their new friends? Does not their own safety and importance in the political system, absolutely depend upon supporting the independence of our country? Of Holland or the United Provinces, I know not what to say. They can scarce be ranked among the belligerent powers. The objects of Holland are peace, with that freedom to her commerce, which she had a right to demand in virtue of treaties, which Britain has annulled; as also restitution of her conquered territories, and reparation of the destruction committed upon her navigation. Britain will not gratify Holland in any of these respects, unless she grants the aids claimed, and thereby plunges herself into the war against the House of Bourbon and America, which she can never do. Thus a partial pacification between them is not likely to take place. America will not consent that the independence of her empire shall be brought into question, or that her rights and claims shall be litigated and adjusted in a Congress, in which she is not properly represented by her Minister. Nevertheless, these things will, I am persuaded, be attempted, and I fear they will not meet with a very vigorous opposition from a quarter, which we have a right to expect should stoutly oppose them.[18] Should a Congress be assembled in this half matured state of things, is there any reasonable ground to hope that the professed design of it, a general pacification, can be accomplished? The determination of such bodies, are, however, so frequently influenced by improper motives, that he who concludes that such a matter cannot be the result merely because it ought not to be, may find himself egregiously deceived in the end.