I accompanied it with the estimate of the Board of War, after making a deduction of many articles, the demand of which I apprehended would throw an unfavorable cast on the whole business. A translated duplicate of the complete estimate had been long since delivered by Dr Franklin. The Count de Vergennes exclaimed vehemently against the exorbitance of the demand, to which the strength of our army was so disproportioned, adding, that duplicate cargoes of such value could not be afforded, and that the articles demanded would exhaust all our money; for he refused to understand as I did, the intention of Congress to solicit the supplies in addition to the loan. Argument and expostulation on this subject were fruitless. In pursuance of his definitive request, I formed a reduced list accompanied by a letter, a copy of which has been transmitted. An allowance was made for the Lafayette's cargo, as well as a very imperfect sketch of it could enable me. This list was immediately referred to the War Department. In all my interviews with the Ministers, I endeavored to represent in their strongest light the following important articles. That notwithstanding the unalterable determination of the United States to support their independence, notwithstanding the virtue and firmness of the citizens in general, the immense pecuniary resources of Great Britain, and her constant naval superiority were advantages too decisive to be counterbalanced by any interior exertions on the part of the United States. That these must infallibly impose a term to the efforts of a nation, whose extended maritime and inland frontier rendered her obnoxious to sudden descents and incursions on all sides; whose army was consequently exposed to excessive marches, attended with insupportable expense of money and waste of soldiers, that the exhausted state of their finances reduced Congress to the impossibility of calling the natural resources of the country into activity; that the aggravated calamities of a war, which in its principles had been precautionary, began now to produce dangerous uneasinesses and discontents; that we had concealed enemies to contend against; that the British left no measures unattempted either of open force or secret intrigue; and finally, unless instant succor were afforded as solicited by Congress, that France was in danger of losing all the fruits of the part she had hitherto taken in the contest; that if instead of being actuated by a generous and enlightened policy, the Court of France had systematically protracted the war, in order that Britain and America might mutually exhaust themselves, while she had reserved her power to decide only in the last extremity, this period with respect to America had arrived; that the importance of the objects of the war on one hand, and the mischiefs of suffering Great Britain to re-annex to herself the resources of America, demanded the greatest exertions;