SUBSTANCE OF A CONFERENCE BETWEEN M. DE LA LUZERNE AND GENERAL WASHINGTON AT HEAD QUARTERS, WEST POINT.[28] September 16th, 1779. The Minister opened the conference by observing, that the Council of Massachusetts had represented to him the disadvantages, which their commerce was likely to suffer from the late misfortune in Penobscot, and the advantages which would result if his Excellency, Count d'Estaing, could detach a few ships of the line and frigates to be stationed upon their coast for protecting their commerce, and countenancing the operations of their cruisers against that of the enemy. But before he should propose such a measure to Count d'Estaing, he wished to know from the General, what purposes the detachment would answer to his military operations, and whether it would enable him to prosecute any offensive enterprise against the enemy. That if he could accompany the request of the Council with assurance of this kind, a motive of such importance would have the greatest influence in determining the concurrence of Count d'Estaing, and might the better justify him in deranging or contracting his plans in the West Indies, by making a detachment of his force. The General answered, that if Count d'Estaing could spare a detachment superior to the enemy's naval force upon this continent, retaining such a force in the West Indies, as would put it out of the enemy's power to detach an equal force to this continent without leaving themselves inferior in the Islands, the measure would have a high probability of many important and perhaps decisive advantages; but these would depend upon several contingencies; as the time in which the detachment can arrive, and the position and force of the enemy when it arrives. That the season proper for military operations was now pretty far advanced, and to make a winter campaign would require a disposition of our magazines peculiar to it, which could not be made without a large increase of expense, a circumstance not to be desired in the present posture of our affairs, unless the arrival of a naval succor was an event of some certainty. That with respect to the position and force of the enemy, they had now about fourteen thousand men at New York and its dependencies, and between three and four thousand at Rhode Island; that to reduce the former, if it should be concentered on the Island, would require extensive preparations beforehand, both as to magazines and aids of men, which could not with propriety be undertaken on a precarious expectation of assistance. But that if the garrison of Rhode Island should continue there, we should have every reason to expect its reduction by a combined operation; it might, however, be withdrawn; he added, that the enemy appear to be making large detachments from New York, which the present situation of their affairs seems to exact; that there is a high