I have heard it said, that commerce will not bear a five per cent duty. Those who make such assertions must be very little acquainted with the subject. The articles of commerce are either such as people want, or such as they do not want. If they be such as people want, they must be purchased at the price for which they can be had; and the duty being on all, gives to no seller any advantage over another. If, on the contrary, the article be such as people do not want, they must either increase their industry so as to afford the use of it with the duty, or else they must dispense with that use. In the former case, the commerce is just where it was, and in the latter case the people consume less of foreign superfluities, which certainty is a public benefit.[38] I have also heard it said, that the duty should be carried to the account of the State where it is levied. What can be the object of those, who contend for this point, I know not. If there are doubts as to the justice of Congress, that body should not have been intrusted with the power of apportioning quotas on the several States. If, on the contrary, those who make this proposition, expect that the commercial States, by carrying the five per cent duty to their private account, can derive from their neighbors, the idea is as fallacious as it is unjust. The equity of Congress would lead them to relax so much in the quotas as would render the contribution of the States proportionate, or if that could not be done, the suffering State would be induced to carry on its commerce. Thus the end would be defeated, as indeed it ought; for surely the advantage derived by the mercantile States, as a mercantile profit, is sufficient without exacting a revenue in addition to it. Articles imported into the country are consumed in the country. If each pays a duty, that duty will be paid by all. The tax will fall equally on all, and therefore ought, in justice, to be carried to the general account. I have also heard it suggested, that the public debts ought to be divided among the several States, and each be called to provide for its proportion. This measure would be sufficient to destroy the credit of any country. The creditors trust the Union, and there can be no right to alter the pledge which they have accepted for any other, even for a better one, without their free consent. But this is not all; there is in it a principle of disunion implied, which must be ruinous. Even at this late period, the States might singly be subjugated. Their strength is derived from their union. Everything, therefore, which injures that union, must impair the strength which is dependent upon it.