This circumstance has postponed my journey for a few days. But this is not all; the daily demands on me for money are considerable, and beyond the utmost extent of any funds I can command. The demands for past dues in compensation for past services, and the like, are rejected; but those for the prosecution of the campaign must be attended to. If, in my absence, and from that cause there be any stoppage, or considerable delay, the consequences will be equally injurious to my reputation, and to the public service. I have before mentioned to you, that my dependence for immediate supplies of money, is on the produce of bills of exchange. I am sorry now to observe, that this dependence fails, and from a cause equally prejudicial to France and to the United States, considered in their collective capacity, though, perhaps, advantageous to individuals. Your Excellency will remember, that when I was called to the administration, the bills of your army had been selling for two thirds, and even so low as for one half of their value in Europe. What might have been the causes of this, it is not my business to inquire. The fact is incontestable. Your Excellency observed it, and endeavored to remedy the evil, by holding your own bills at five sixths. But the merchants, who had benefited by the former low rate, could not be brought at once to make so considerable an advance. They expected that the same causes, which had reduced bills to one half, must again bring them down; and, therefore, were disposed to wait the event. I take the liberty here to observe, that the fluctuation of exchange will naturally strengthen that expectation, and nothing but steady, firm perseverance on the part of the administration, can, or indeed ought, to produce a ready sale on good terms. Bills of exchange are remitted to France in payment for European commodities. If the cost of this remittance is fixed, commerce may so far be established on true commercial principles; otherwise, it is a mere game of hazard. Sensible of this, the merchant will rather wait, with his money in his chest, the event of public necessity, than invest that money in bills, which may shortly after be bought on better terms by his more cautious neighbor. Hence it follows, that the public will really command less money than they otherwise might. Nor is that all. While the public can command the money of the merchants as fast as it comes into their hands, the servants of the public can spend that money to advantage, and the very expenditure will increase the circulation, so as to bring it again sooner into the hands of the merchant. Your good sense, Sir, your experience, and the unremitted attention, which I have perceived you pay to every object which can relate to the service of your Sovereign, will render it necessary for me to prosecute any further these observations.