After the full conversation with which we were honored on the 12th instant, it is unnecessary to enter at large into those reasons, or to urge the pressing necessity of economising our affairs so as to make our revenues in a great degree meet our expenses. Your Excellency must be equally sensible with us of the necessity, and we are perfectly convinced that you are disposed to assist in every measure tending to promote so desirable an object. You are also sensible of the impolicy of calling on the States for men or money, in numbers or quantities so extensive as to excite among even the zealous and considerate, ideas of the impracticability of carrying on the war on such terms. Demands of this nature, instead of animating to exertions, are only productive of hopeless languor. Your mortifying experience of the inadequate compliance of the States heretofore, with your former requisitions, will explain the motives inducing to the expediency of moderating those demands, so as to render them productive, and in case of failure to leave the delinquent State without excuse. Your Excellency has no doubt considered that the class of men who are willing to become soldiers is much diminished by the war, and therefore the difficulties of raising an army equal to former establishments has increased, and will continue to increase, and embarrass the States in their measures for filling up their quotas, should the mode of recruiting the army be continued in the present line. You will also have considered, that the enemy proportionably debilitated by war, is incapable of opposing to us the force we originally had to encounter; and, therefore, the necessity of such extensive levies as we formerly raised, seems to be in some measure superseded. In what degree the forces of these States should be decreased, we do not pretend to determine, leaving this to your Excellency's better judgment. But from past experience it appears, that the States are incapable of bringing into the field an army equal to that called for by the last arrangement; or, if all the demands of Congress on the States become merely pecuniary it does not seem probable that they can or will furnish money for raising, equipping, and supporting such an army. We wish we were capable, from any information we are possessed of, to assist your Excellency in the investigation of the subject with respect to the probable designs or force of the enemy the next campaign. This must in its nature depend upon contingencies at present even beyond conjecture. At this time, therefore, in our apprehension, the only solid grounds of procedure is to consider what force these States are capable of producing.