But when these preliminaries shall be invariably established, it may be of consequence to determine what duration should be given to the suspension of arms. The plan of the mediators proposes one year; but this term appears too short not to be illusory. In fact, it should be observed, that the fire of war being kindled in the four quarters of the world, one part of the year will have revolved before the orders can be received by the respective commanders; so that tranquillity will be established in Europe, while hostilities continue in America and in the Indies. Besides, all the powers remaining armed, the slightest circumstance may occasion a violation of the truce. In fine, it is in vain to flatter ourselves with the hope of concluding a definitive peace in the short space of one year; as, exclusive of the variety of subjects, that must necessarily be discussed, the two mediating Courts are at a great distance from each other; nor is there less between the belligerent powers; and we should deceive ourselves, if we supposed, that all the propositions, which will be made on the one part, and on the other, will not give room for much debate and altercation; or, that they will not, consequently, consume much time. To these considerations we ought to add, that an armistice for one year would be very burdensome, because the powers at war will be obliged to remain in arms, to their manifest loss, as it will be impracticable to disarm, as well from the dispersion of the troops, as from the enormous expense, if, (which is highly probable) it should become necessary to renew hostilities. If, then, the mediators wish sincerely to establish the peace they propose, they should prefer a truce of many years to a simple armistice for one year. This expedient is better adapted to consolidate their work, than a suspension of arms for a short time. But a truce will have the same inconveniences, and be equally dangerous with an armistice, if the belligerent powers remain under arms. Thus it seems necessary to agree at the same time reciprocally to disarm. But supposing these two points settled, there remains another equally important, that is the _statu quo_. Neither France nor Spain have any reason to reject it, so far as they are individually concerned. This is not the case with the Americans. To be satisfied of this, we need only cast our eyes upon the _points_, that the British troops actually occupy upon the continent of North America. The question, then, will be to obtain the consent of the United States, and this consent can only be demanded by the two Courts that offer their mediation, for the reasons that have already been urged.