Sir, I embrace the first moment after my return from Virginia, to comply with the request of the principal officers of our army, in tendering you their sincere respects. I have already forwarded to your Excellency a letter from Count de Rochambeau; on my return here, I found letters from my Court, dated in February last. They do not announce anything pacific, on the part of our enemies. No progress is made in the mediation of the Courts of Vienna and Petersburg, and the Court of London seems determined to risk the event of another campaign, in which they will employ all the strength they have left. The plan for the campaign was not yet finally decided, it depending on some arrangements, which were yet to be made with the Court of Madrid, and on some advices, which were expected from the Antilles. It nevertheless seemed to be the intention to act vigorously for the assistance of the United States, and though no particular assurances could be given me on this head, yet from what they write me, it is probable that New York or Charleston, or perhaps both, will be the object of their efforts next campaign. I think it, however, proper to inform you, that at the same time they announce to me their general views, they observe, that it is an unhappy circumstance, that the American army is so weak as it is; and they seem to fear, that it will not be in a condition to second their efforts, when it shall be necessary to strike, a decisive stroke, or to undertake operations, in which such extensive means are required as in a siege. I beg your Excellency would enable me to give my Court the necessary information on a matter so important as this is. I am not curious to know any of the particular details relative to your army, which it may be necessary to keep secret, but the military operations of France and America are so intimately connected, that it is indispensable for us to know what is the actual force and means which you have, in order to calculate with any degree of probability what enterprises can be undertaken. Our ignorance in this respect cannot but be very prejudicial to our affairs, because, if from false information we consider your army as weaker than it really is, it will prevent our forming plans, which it would be possible to execute; and if, on the contrary, we are led to believe it stronger than it really is, we run the risk of forming plans impracticable in their execution. It is from these considerations, that I beg of you to confide to me such information on this head as you may think proper, both with respect to the actual force you have at the different parts of the continent, and what it will probably be in the course of the campaign. It is equally interesting to know the force of the enemy, both in regulars and militia. I beg you to rest assured of the discretion, with which I shall make use of these communications.