Besides this, the effects of these steps taken by the Court of London, have been to engage France to pursue, with redoubled vigor, the measures that have given birth to these appearances of peace, but which would certainly not terminate in it, if England perceived that her enemies relaxed their efforts in any manner. It is above all things indispensable, that the United States should, in the course of this campaign, be in a situation to co-operate in vigorous enterprises, which may be formed. It appears that the design of the Court of London, pointed out by the debates in Parliament, is to reduce, by a defensive war, their operations upon this continent. The Minister of his Most Christian Majesty has at present no information relative to the plans of the approaching campaign. But whatever they may be, it would be useful to be enabled to inform his Court, that the United States will not adopt an inactivity, which would be equivalent to the truce required. But that their design is to trouble the repose, that the enemy wish to deliver themselves to, and that the operations, whether combined or separately undertaken by the United States, will be pushed with activity during the ensuing campaign. As to the place of the negotiations, Congress knew in 1779, when they named a Plenipotentiary, and in 1781, when they gave him three Colleagues, that it could only be in Europe, and that this was the most effectual means of preventing delays and jealousy, and of maintaining the confidence and harmony, which has so happily subsisted hitherto between the allies. It would be important, that the Minister of his Majesty could inform his Court, that Congress persists in these dispositions; and, that in case Commissaries offer to treat upon this continent, they should be referred to the Ministers of the United States, who are provided with instructions on this subject in Europe; that the Court of London should address itself to them; and that it is impossible that the seat of negotiation should be in America. When these overtures were made to the Court of Versailles, the agent made no mention of those that were to be made in America, or to the American Ministers in Europe. It is obvious, that the design of this conduct is to inspire reciprocal distrust; and the Chevalier de la Luzerne conceives it can in no way more effectually be prevented, than by a full communication of every circumstance, which shall relate to the pacification and to the interests of the alliance, which shall come to his knowledge. * * * * * GEORGE WASHINGTON TO M. DE LA LUZERNE. Head Quarters, June 5th, 1782. Sir, I have the honor of conveying to your Excellency the enclosed address of the officers of the American army under my immediate command, on the auspicious event of the birth of a Dauphin.