So much would not perhaps have been said on the head of this objection, if it did not naturally lead to a position, which has hitherto been ruinous, and might prove fatal. There are many men, and some of them honest men, whose zeal against speculation leads them to be sometimes unmindful not only of sound policy, but even of moral justice. It is not uncommon to hear, that those who have bought the public debts for small sums, ought only to be paid their purchase money. The reasons given are, that they have taken advantage of the distressed creditor, and shown a diffidence in the public faith. As to the first, it must be remembered, that in giving the creditor money for his debt, they have at least afforded him some relief, which he could not obtain elsewhere, and if they are deprived of the expected benefit, they will never afford such relief again. As to the second, those who buy up the public debts, show at least as much confidence in the public faith as those who sell them. But allowing, for argument sake, that they have exhibited the diffidence complained of, it would certainly be wiser to remove than to justify it. The one mode tends to create, establish, and secure public credit, and the other to sap, overturn, and destroy it. Policy is, therefore, on this, as I believe it to be on every other occasion, upon the same side of the question with honesty. Honesty tells us, that the duty of the public to pay, is like the same duty in an individual. Having benefited by the advances, they are bound to replace them to the party, or to his representatives. The debt is a species of property, and whether disposed of for the whole nominal value, or the half, for something, or for nothing, is totally immaterial. This right of receiving and the duty of paying must always continue the same. In a word, that government which can, through the intervention of its Courts, compel payment of private debts, and performance of private contracts, on principles of distributive justice, but refuses to be guided by those principles as to their own contracts, merely because they are not amenable to human laws, shows a flagitious contempt of moral obligations, which must necessarily weaken, as it ought to do, their authority over the people.