The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 12
History
The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 12
United States -- Foreign relations -- 1775-1783; United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783 -- Sources
per month, public lands must sell extremely low, were the title ever
so clear. What then can be expected, when the validity of that title
is one object of the war?
I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT MORRIS.
* * * * *
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Office of Finance, July 30th, 1782.
Sir,
I do myself the honor to enclose for the inspection of Congress,
estimates for the service of the year 1783, amounting in the whole to
eleven millions. I should be strictly justified in praying a
requisition of the United States for that sum, but I conceive that the
demands made should be the lowest which our circumstances will
possibly admit of. I am persuaded, that if the United States in
Congress will adopt those means of economy, which are in their power,
we may save two millions; and, therefore, on a presumption that those
means will be adopted, I shall ask only nine millions. Congress will
observe, that the estimates of the Marine Department amount to two
millions and a half; whereas there was no estimate made for that
service in the last year, any more than for the Civil List. There can
be no doubt that the enemy have changed their mode of warfare, and
will make their principal exertions in the naval line. It becomes us,
therefore, to make like exertions, and that for the plainest reasons.
Experience has shown that the efforts to obtain a large army have for
many years proved utterly fruitless. The only effect of those efforts,
has been to enhance the price of such men as were obtained, and
thereby to disable the States, who exerted themselves to raise
recruits, from pouring supplies into the public Treasury. Thus we have
not only been unable to get more men, but also to pay and support
those which we had gotten. Admitting, however, that the required
number were obtained and properly supported as an army, these things
are clear; first, that without naval aid we could not make an
impression on the enemy's posts. Secondly, that they would be able to
harass and distress us in every quarter, by predatory incursions.
Thirdly, that they would prevent us from receiving those supplies,
which are necessary alike to the operations and existence of an army.
And, fourthly, that their inroads on our commerce would produce such
distress to the country, as to make our revenues utterly unproductive,
and finally bring our affairs to destruction.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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