2dly. It is evident from a consideration of their modes of taxation, (which they are all very obstinately attached to,) that they never will be punctually collected. 3dly. The punctuality in the payment of interest is essential to public credit. 4thly. As Congress forego their right to insist on the principal, it is but just that they should have every possible security for the interest. 5thly. As the people are in either case to pay the supposed tax at certain periods it must be a matter of indifference to what particular man the payment is made. 6thly. The objection raised in favor of elected tax gatherers, viz. that they consider the circumstances of the people, which is saying in other words, that they are guilty of favor and partiality, is the strongest reason why the collectors should be appointed by, and amenable to, Congress. 7thly. It is a kind of absurdity in itself, that Congress should have a right to the tax, and yet no right to send their servants to receive it. I pray leave also to observe, that the revenues must be co-existent with the debt. No man in his senses will lend on any other terms. If the revenue be only for a fixed period of time, no more can be borrowed on it than the price of an annuity for such a time. And it has already been observed, that money must be _borrowed_ to _pay_ the public creditors, because they have a just right to their _money_. Another observation on this subject I must take the liberty to impress. The more clear, certain, permanent, and increasing the funds are, the lower will be the interest at which money can be borrowed. If the funds be very good, money may be borrowed at four per cent, perhaps at three per cent. If they are not good it will not be procured for less than six, seven, or eight per cent, and perhaps not at all. Proper reflections on this subject will naturally suggest themselves, and it will not be forgotten, that whether the debt be less or greater, and whether the interest be higher or lower the _people must pay all_. With respect to the impost I conceive it to be justly exceptionable, because that an estimation ad valorem is arbitrary, and the law ought in all cases to be clear and explicit. The impost on prizes need not, I should suppose, be asked for, because Congress may take measures for the purpose themselves whenever the occasion requires. I conceive also, that a tax might be laid on exports which, without being burdensome, would still be productive. Enclosed is a list of rates, which I take the liberty to submit. I cannot go into a written detail of the reasons for them, because my time will not permit.