Nevertheless, Nesselrode soon found it necessary to modify his opinions. Ideas had advanced since the death of Alexander, and it was impossible to restrain the Russian spirit, which had decided in the most energetic manner in favour of Greece; it therefore required military food, and a war was indispensable. The influence of Metternich over the cabinet of St. Petersburg daily lost ground from this moment, and Nesselrode began to draw off from Germany, and become more essentially Russian in his principles and ideas; he also began to take a decided turn in favour of the Greeks. Nor in this conduct ought he to be reproached with inconstancy, for the times and circumstances were no longer the same, the monarchical principle having triumphed every where, in Piémont as well as at Madrid and at Naples, while Poland appeared entirely subject to her viceroy Constantine. Under these circumstances it was less difficult to discern the holy and heroic principle of the Greek revolution, and to rekindle the ardent hope of an independence, acquired by means of so many pious sacrifices. From this new tendency of affairs, Nesselrode found himself the antagonist of Metternich, with whom he had hitherto been agreed; but the Russian interest now prevailed over the Austrian spirit. The friendship between France and Russia dates from the year 1815, and was increased at the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, under the influence of the Duc de Richelieu; but at that period, as we learn from the despatches of Count Nesselrode, France was too much overwhelmed by the fatal consequences of the two invasions to take an active part in affairs, or afford a support that would make her alliance worth seeking by the various cabinets of Europe: but from the year 1819 France exhibited such a developement of vital powers and military energy, that Russia hastened to include her in her diplomatic means. The inclinations of the French cabinet turned in this direction, under the Duc de Richelieu and M. Dessolles; and they continued thus until the more English administrations of Polignac, of Montmorency, and of Villèle. The ministry of M. de la Ferronays again was favourable to the Russian alliance; and the ties that now bound France to Russia were not merely those of gratitude for the services rendered at the restoration, but the well-grounded conviction that the Russian alliance could on no occasion injure our interests, but might, on the contrary, on many occasions augment our diplomatic influence and our territorial boundaries. The collection of the despatches of Nesselrode and Pozzo di Borgo during this interval, and all the diplomatic papers that exist in the Foreign Office, attest the good-will of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, and the offers made secretly by it to obtain the alliance and concurrence of France on the Eastern question.